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Each of us is a person with diverse experiences. Each of us
brings to the bench experiences that affect our view of law and
life and decision-making....
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The conveners of this Symposium have asked us to think about judi-
cial election, judicial selection, and judicial accountability. Although
plans for the symposium were made more than a year ago, the subject
remains topical - capturing newspaper headlines, television air time,
and law professors' conversations - as we continue to debate the quali-
ties of Rose Bird, Cruz Reynoso, Joseph Grodin, Robert Bork, Douglas
Ginsburg, and most recently, Anthony Kennedy. These debates have
taken for granted some attributes of judging that I will examine. I am
interested in the person of the judge and in the qualities demanded for
legitimate judging. I have two central questions: First, what are the con-
temporary aspirations for those who judge? Second, how do feminist
theories inform or challenge these aspirations?
At one level, the answer to the first question is so easy that some
might suggest it is a "straw person." A vast body of legal literature
addresses the question of what qualifies a person to be a judge. We speak
about seeking individuals who will be "impartial," "disengaged,"
"independent," and who will hear both sides and judge fairly.1 Yet, as I
will describe in some detail below, what constitutes these qualities is
complex. The current state of the law reflects either irreconcilable dis-
agreements about when impartiality exists or unending difficulties in
applying the theoretical demands for impartiality and disengagement.
The tensions between stated expectations and practice lend an air of
unreality to the articulated demands for impartiality. As the opening
excerpt from the confirmation proceedings of Justice Lucas illustrates,
current requirements for impartiality seem almost perfunctory - either
1. For illustrative cases, see, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); May-
berry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927). A classic commentary is provided by John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges,
56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947).
I should acknowledge my ethnocentricity at the outset. This essay addresses the role of the
judge in the United States. For a rich comparative analysis, see MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES
OF JUSTICE AND STATE AtTHORrrY (1986); for a cross-cultural analysis, see the series of articles on
judicial "conflicts of interest" in 18 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 689 et seq. (1970).
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not to be taken seriously or to be understood as ritualistic incantations of
a tradition, the content of which is obscure.
To preview my second concern, feminist approaches inform the dis-
cussion of who shall be our judges by raising questions about the very
terms - disengagement, impartiality, independence - that we have long
taken for granted. For example, some feminist theories can be used as
the basis to criticize the narrowness of the current conceptualization of
desirable judicial attributes and to argue for supplementation: that our
judges have an "ethic of care" as well as an ethic of justice.2 Other femi-
nist approaches see such assimilation as impossible - that the qualities
of impartiality, disengagement, and independence cannot coexist with the
values of nurturance, connectedness, and interdependence. Another fem-
inist critique3 raises questions about the very office of the judge, with its
dependence upon hierarchy4 and violence.5 The position of power held
by contemporary judges could well be incoherent in a world in which
interactions are not premised upon the domination imposed by current
hierarchical relations. Still other feminist approaches leave the office of
the judge intact but seek profound transformation of the image of the
judge - from a powerful unrelated "Other" to a connected, powerful,
and responsible not-so "other." 6 In short, feminist perspectives can both
help us to understand why the received tradition is incomplete and unsat-
isfying and to create other conceptions of the judicial.
Two additional introductory comments are in order. First, note the
difference in longevity between the received traditions of judging and
feminist considerations of aspirations for our judges. For hundreds of
2. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, at 174 passim (1982); see also Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CI. L. REv. 1 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4
LAW & INEQUALITY 159 (1986).
3. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: A JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 515 (1982); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: A JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 635,
658 (1983) ("Once masculinity appears as a specific position, not just as the way things are, its
judgments will be revealed in process and procedure, as well as in adjudication and legislation.").
4. A caveat: Judicial systems vary in the degree and nature of hierarchy. See M. DAMASKA,
supra note 1, at 16-46; Laura Nader and Andree Sursock, Anthropology and Justice, in JUSTICE:
VIEWS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 205-233 (Ronald L. Cohen ed. 1986).
5. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Cover,
Violence].
6. ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A FEMINIST THE-
OLOGY (1983); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUDIES 342 (1980) [hereinafter
Ruddick, Maternal Thinking]; Sara Ruddick, Preservative Love and Military Destruction: Some
Reflections on Mothering and Peace, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 231 (Joyce
Trebilcot ed. 1984) [hereinafter Ruddick, Preservative Love].
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years, legal commentators have written about the attributes of good
judges. There is a view in the United States of who shall judge; that view
is both codified and regularly expounded - even though complex and far
less determinate than might be thought at first glance. But the idea that
women may participate in deciding who the state should empower to
judge, let alone in ways at odds with the conventional wisdom, is of
recent vintage. Moreover, there is not a single voice of feminism, not a
feminist approach, but many who are exploring the possible ways of
being that are distinct from those structured in a world dominated by the
power and words of men.7 Thus, feminist theories of judging are in the
midst of creation and are not (and perhaps will never aspire to be8) as
solidified as the legal doctrine of judging can sometimes appear to be.
Second, this work is intended to enable a dialogue between two tra-
ditions - the law of judges and feminist theory - that have not, hereto-
fore, spoken with each other. I hope to address an audience familiar with
one or the other topic, but not necessarily familiar with the terms of
both. Consequently, the first two sections of this essay are devoted to
explaining the legal requirements of judging - largely by reference to
the law of disqualification - while the third and some of the fourth sec-
tions provide examples of feminist theories and practices. Thereafter, I
explore the interaction between the two traditions. Given the assump-
tion of my readers' varied expertise, let me begin by explaining my title.
Bias is not only a word used by legal scholars to indicate an impermis-
sible kind of judgment. "On the bias" is a phrase familiar to those who
cut and sew cloth; as Webster's Dictionary explains, the bias is "a line
diagonal to the grain of a fabric, [and is] ... a line often utilized in the
cutting of garments for smoother fit."9
I. THE RECEIVED TRADITION
I run the risk of being called pretentious because I am about to
quote myself. I use the following quote not as an exercise in self-eleva-
tion but rather as an admission of complicity with the tradition that I
will question below. In 1982, concerned about a move towards more
"managerial judges," I wrote:
7. See generally JEAN GRIMSHAW, PHILOSOPHY AND FEMINIST THINKING (1986); SANDRA
HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986) [hereinafter HARDING, THE SCIENCE
QUESTION]; ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).
8. See HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 7, at 243 (arguing for "open acknowl-
edgment, even enthusiastic appreciation, of certain tensions that appear in the feminist critiques," as
contrasted with the "coerciveness" of "modem science.").
9. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 82 (1963).
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Until recently, the United States' legal establishment embraced a class-
ical view of the judicial role. Under this view, judges arenot supposed
to have an involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate.
Disengagement and dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide
cases fairly and impartially. The mythic emblems surrounding the
goddess Justice illustrate this vision of the proper judicial attitude: Jus-
tice carries scales, reflecting the obligation to balance claims fairly; she
possesses a sword, giving her great power to enforce decisions; and she
wears a blindfold, protecting her from distractions.' 0
This passage summarized the views, found in Supreme Court opinions
and in legions of commentary, on the appropriate judicial stance. From
the Code of Judicial Conduct 1" to federal statutes, 12 the buzz words are
the same: "Impartiality" is required; "bias" is forbidden. Judges must
not have economic or personal stakes in the lawsuits adjudicated; rather
judges must be disengaged, gaining nothing from the decisions rendered.
Before debunking sets in - first in the form of showing that the
theoretical aspirations are often not required in practice, and second in
the form of raising questions about whether, in theory, these aspirations
are themselves so desirable - let me pause to celebrate the impulses that
lead to these aspirations for judges. One of the central challenges faced
by judges is to separate themselves from the sovereigns that employ
them.' 3 A judge is always an employee of the government. However,
10. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982). As will be discussed
infra notes 244-54 and accompanying text, my questioning of this statement does not necessarily
require retraction of the criticisms I made of managerial judges.
11. See American Bar Association, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C) (1984).
A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts con-
cerning the proceeding; (b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer con-
cerning the matter....
As of 1984, 45 states and parts of the federal system had adopted the Code, in whole or in part, by
rule or statute. See STEVEN LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH: ETHICAL REsTRICTIONS ON THE EXTRA-
JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 4 (1984); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987).
12. The relevant federal statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455.
13. See Robert M. Cover, Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 Capital U. L. Rev. 179,
183-90 (1985) (the battles of Simeon ben Shetah and King Yannai; of Lord Coke and James I)
[hereinafter, Cover, Folktales of Justice]; Cover, Violence, supra note 5, at 1619-21 (the conflict
between Judge Herbert Stem and the State Department). See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUS-
TICE ACCUSED (1975); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727,
1741-49 (1987) (monarchs' attempts to link themselves with justice); Note, Justice Without Favor:
Due Process and Separation of Executive and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J.
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unlike ordinary government employees, a judge has extraordinary pow-
ers. A judge must rule on lawsuits to which the government is a party 14
and thus must sometimes rule against her or his employer - must con-
tradict the very government that empowers the judge to speak, that gives
the judge her or his grant of jurisdiction. To borrow Robert Cover's
eloquence, "[f]or that ultimate purpose - speaking truth to power -
there must be a jurisdiction of the judge which the [government] cannot
share."
1 5
A sovereign's power is a genuine threat to fair judgment. Judges of
all eras have encountered sovereigns who seek to have judges render deci-
sions that please. Robert Cover told several such "folktales of jurisdic-
tion," about the battles between (sometimes) brave judges and
sovereigns.1 6 In our generation, we have examples that demonstrate the
powers of the sovereign. When (then) federal district judge Herbert
Stern presided at a criminal hijacking trial in the United States Court for
the District of Berlin, the State Department attempted to instruct him on
how to decide the case. The judge asserted his jurisdiction, his power to
disagree with the sovereign by sitting in judgment of its actions. Judge
Stern succeeded in resisting governmental pressure in the highly visible
criminal hijacking prosecution, but he was more vulnerable when civil
litigants sought the assistance of the United States Court for the District
of Berlin. The State Department relieved Judge Stern of his duties and
1675, 1677-78, nn. 14-21 (1985) (fear of kingly corruption ofjudges); W. R. Lederman, The Indepen-
dence of the Judiciary, 34 CANADIAN. BAR. REV. 768, 771-79 (1956) (history of English courts'
efforts to separate from kingly rule).
14. Between June 30, 1985 and June 30, 1986, 254,828 civil cases were filed in the United
States district courts. The United States was a plaintiff in 60,779 and a defendant in 31,051. In
other words, the United States was a party to more than one-third of the civil cases and was, by
definition, a party to all of the 41,490 criminal cases filed during the same time period in the federal
district courts. 1986 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS [hereinafter, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT] at 169 (Table C),
175 (Table C2), 232 (Table D-l). See also United States v. Zuger, 602 F.Supp 889 (D. Conn. 1984)
(pro se litigant challenged judge's capacity to preside in tax prosecution because judge's salary paid
by the government), aff'd, 755 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 805 (1985).
15. Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 13, at 190.
16. Id. at 183-90. For example, Cover recounted a story, from the Babylonian Talmud, offered
to explain the phrase: "The king does not judge and we do not judge him." According to the tale,
the judges of the Sanhedrin called King Yannai to testify in a case involving one of his servants. The
King appeared and challenged the court; he would only testify if all the judges would so command
him. All except Simeon ben Shetah declined to order the King to testify. Simeon then appealed to
God to call the weak judges to account. The Angel Gabriel responded by killing them all, save the
brave judge Simeon. Id. at 184.
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sent him home. 17 Although Judge Stern could be fired from his job in
the specially convened "Article II" court in Berlin,"8 he was able to
return to his protected, life-tenured job as an Article III judge. When
discussing his actions in defiance of the State Department, Stern won-
dered how much his safety net of life tenure empowered him to rule as he
believed was right. 19
The drama in Berlin is not the only example of a sovereign's attempt
to influence judges. The recent defeat of former Justices Rose Bird, Cruz
Reynoso, and Joseph Grodin, all of the California Supreme Court, is
another example of sovereign power, this time in the personage of the
popular vote rather than the executive branch. The electorate (prompted
by a massive media campaign) turned the unpopular justices out of
office.2" Yet a third example comes from commentators who report that
the Reagan administration's selection process depends upon applicants'
prospective allegiance to the goals of that government.2 1 Whether a "lit-
mus" test exists in fact or not, the government retains the capacity to
choose which of its judges shall be promoted to higher office. While fed-
eral judges' jobs may not depend upon their willingness to please, benefits
may flow to those who do. Little wonder then that we hope for judges
who are independent, that we aspire to an impartiality that pays no spe-
cial attention to the government as litigant, that we reinterpret the blind-
fold of justice as protecting judges from the knowledge of the identity of
the parties.22
17. See Cover, Violence, supra note 5, at 1619-21; United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S.
Ct. for Berlin 1979); HERBERT J. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984); ROBERT M. COVER,
OWEN M. FIss, & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE, ch. 6 (1988).
18. The United States Court for Berlin had been created as part of the United States' post-
World War II occupation of Berlin; the executive branch had administrative authority and had
appointed Stem. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 237.
19. H. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN, supra note 17, at 372.
20. Chief Justice Bird's commitment to the unconstitutionality of the death penalty was used
by many as a basis for arguing against her retention. See Keith Love & Frank Clifford, Bird Hurt by
Her Image as Foe of Death Penalty, L.A. Times, June 16, 1986, Part 1, at 1, col. 2. Detailed exami-
nations of Justice Bird's electoral ouster are found in Joseph Grodin's and Robert Thompson's arti-
cles in this symposium, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969 and 2007.
21. Susan F. Rasky, Administration Renews Struggle to Agree on an Acceptable Choice, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 4. Some report that Justice Department officials interview candidates
on their beliefs about a variety of issues likely to be confronted by the Supreme Court.
22. See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L. J. 447, 496 ("The traditional
figure of Justice wears a blindfold, to avoid being influenced by the identity of the parties"). Cf.
Curtis & Resnik, supra note 13, at 1754-64 (blindfolds became frequent in Justice imagery around
the sixteenth century; some of the blindfolds were used as derisive commentary on the limits of
justice).
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In addition to seeking judges who are impartial and independent, we
hope our judges will not prejudge lawsuits. The concern about prejudg-
ment may be related to the issue of independence: If prejudgment is
based upon the identity of the litigants, one can be concerned about deci-
sionmaking unrelated to the merits of a dispute. A ban on prejudgment
in itself is somewhat less obvious; judgment is permissible, but
prejudgment is a problem. Deciding at one point in time versus another
is not intrinsically faulty unless the assumption is that prejudgment is
based upon incomplete or inaccurate information. Prejudgment is sus-
pect in the context of a system that assumes an increase in information
over time and designates specific points in time when the act of judging
becomes legitimate. Prejudgment is also suspect in the context of fear of
unequal access to the person of the judge. The idealized moment of trial
provides a scene of equality. All the information, the litigants, and the
judge are assembled at one time, so that judgment can be rendered. The
ban on prejudgment may thus be understood either as a derivative con-
cern, related to litigant inequality, or as a policing device, to control liti-
gants and decision-makers so as to legitimate judgments.
One can also understand the impulse towards seeking judges who
lack self-interest. Judges hold awesome powers in this society. Their
judgments change lives, transfer assets, imprison individuals, and even
determine life and death. How tremendously frightening it would be to
think that judgments were motivated by personal gain, that the interests
of others were routinely sacrificed to advance judges' self-serving goals.
Statements of the requirement of disengagement assuage our anxiety
about judicial promotion of self.
Two other aspects of disengagement might be understood from the
differing vantage points of the judges and the judged. Disengagement
may free judges to act. Psychologically, the distance between judges and
their judgments may enable judges to render the decisions that so pro-
foundly affect the lives of others. If freed from having to engage person-
ally with what occurs subsequent to their judgments, judges may be
enabled to impose rulings that would otherwise be too painful to pro-
nounce. And, psychologically, those who are judged may wish for a
judge who is, at some level, a mystical "Other," not like ourselves but
endowed with special wisdom and insight.23
The imagery of Justice is emblematic of many of these hopes. The
judicial icon is a goddess-like figure, frequently shown with scales, sword,
23. See RICHARD SENNETr, AUTHORITY 17-23, 165-75 (1980). I return to the impact of dis-
engagement, infra, notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
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and, after the sixteenth century, with a blindfold.2 4 First a goddess
within the Greek and Roman traditions, Justitia evolved into Justice, one
of the cardinal virtues endorsed by Christianity.2" As the power to judge
shifted from kings, in the name of gods, to kings in their own right, and
then from kings to judges, governing bodies continued to adorn their
buildings with scenes of the Last Judgment and with images of Justice.
Not simply a relic of the past, Justice still appears in courthouses and
other civic buildings throughout the country.26 How ironic, in a world in
which all judges were men, that sovereigns continued to display Justitia
as the paradigm judge. Yet, given the magnitude of the power that
resides in judges, how appropriate to seek an Other, some mythical fig-
ure, quintessentially nonpartisan, who would have the wisdom of the
divine.
Impartiality, freedom from bias or prejudgment, independence, dis-
engagement. These are terms that are culturally dependent.
Anthropologists remind us that other systems of justice do not require
such attributes for their judges.28 But taken in the context of the exercise
of judgment by state officials rather than by elders known to the commu-
nity, in the context of the history of ongoing struggles between judges
and sovereigns, and in the context of the immense power that judges
possess, the quest for such qualities in judges can be readily appreciated.
24. Curtis & Resnik, supra note 13, at 1729-34.
25. Id. at 1729-30.
26. Id. at 1731-32, 1732 and Figure 1.
27. There are at least two exceptions. In the Book of Judges in the Hebrew Bible, one of the
judges is a woman, Deborah. Most of the biblical "judges" were not judges in our sense of the word
but were leaders who returned the people to the "path" of God. "The LORD set judges over them,
who rescued them from the marauding bands." Judges 2:16, THE NEW ENGLISH BIBLE (Oxford
University Press 1970). Deborah, however, is described as both a "prophetess" and a "judge." "It
was her custom to sit beneath the Palm-tree of Deborah... and the Israelites went up to her for
justice." Judges 4: 4-6. See generally Freema Gottlieb, Three Mothers, 30 Judaism 194 (1981).
A second female judge-like figure is Mary, who, in several pictures of the Last Judgment, is
shown interceding - perhaps on the side of leniency. See SAMUEL EDGERTON, PICTURES AND
PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE 22-
23 (1985). See generally 1 HILDA GRAEF, MARY: A HISTORY OF DOCTRINE AND DEVOTION 145-
50 (1963) (Germanus of Constantinople's sermons of the eighth century described Mary as averting
the wrath of God).
28. See Nader & Sursock, supra note 4; Lee Wei Doo, Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American
Communities, 21 AM. J. OF COMp. L. 627 (1973).
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II. THE FAR MORE COMPLEX REALITY
There are many examples of the gap between aspirations and prac-
tice.29 Below, I provide a few to identify the tensions between rhetoric
and reality. After I discuss some feminist theories, I will return to these
examples to consider how feminist approaches enlighten our understand-
ing of what we demand of judges and why.
A. THE REALITY OF THE RULES
1. The Practice of Disqualification: Who Determines
Who Shall Judge?
In the federal system, litigants who fear that judges do not possess
the requisite impartiality, independence, or disengagement in a specific
instance may seek to have those judges disqualified from adjudicating a
particular case. The procedure for seeking judicial disqualification is set
forth in two federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. section 144 and 28 U.S.C. section
455. Section 144 is general in its terms; a "timely and sufficient affidavit
• . . [demonstrating] personal bias or prejudice" triggers disqualifica-
tion.3° Section 445 offers more specificity by listing circumstances, such
as "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts," service as "coun-
sel, advisor or material witness," and "financial interest" that mandate
disqualification.31 The statutes do not detail the practice for decision-
making, but congressional silence coupled with court decisions have led
to a relatively uniform result: Under both statutes, the parties challeng-
ing judges make applications for disqualification to the very judges
sought to be disqualified.32
29. See generally John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 237 (1987).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 455. The enactment of § 455 strengthened disqualification law, in the sense
that a judge is now required to recuse him or herself under certain, specified circumstances. For
recent Supreme Court interpretation of § 455, see Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,
108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988); for discussion of the legislative history, see McCuin v. Texas Power & Light
Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1983).
32. Section 144 requires disqualification upon the presentation of a "timely" and "sufficient"
affidavit. Case law requires the challenged judge to assess the adequacy of the affidavit, but not the
truth of the allegations. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 27 (1921) (interpreting the earlier
enactment, § 21 of the Judicial Code, which provided for a judge to "proceed no further" upon the
filing of an affidavit that the judge had a "personal prejudice or bias" against a party). Although
§ 455 is silent as to who shall hear disqualification claims, case law has generally required that
claims be initially presented to the challenged judge. Some local rules suggest that motions under
§ 144 or § 455 be directed to another judge. See, e.g., Local Rule 205-3 of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California (1987). This rule requires that:
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Under what theory of disengagement, disinterest, or lack of involve-
ment might one believe that a judge is the appropriate person to assess
his or her own possibly impermissible bias? How could Congress require
disqualification whenever a judge has "personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts," yet permit judges to decide both the facts and the law
of their own relationship to a case? Presumably, the decision to direct
applications of disqualification to the judges who are challenged is not
animated by an untempered commitment to disengagement.' Rather,
other concerns are at work, most obviously deterrence of applications to
disqualify judges. What a powerful disincentive to have to ask the very
person whose fairness is in question to transfer the case to another judge.
Of course, given that the procedural opportunity to challenge a judge
exists in a context of realistic fears of strategic exploitation, an impulse to
be protective of the judge is understandable, but that protection comes at
the price of diminished disengagement.
Other reasons may also prompt the decision to require, as an initial
matter, that the question of disqualification be heard by the challenged
judge. That judge may have familiarity not only with the pending case
but also with the information about his or her own background that gives
rise to the question of bias or impropriety. Time and money is saved by
eliminating the need to provide information to a second jurist.33 In addi-
tion, judges are spared what some consider to be the "unseemly" task of
testifying.34 Also, appellate courts may rectify any errors that occur,
3 5
Whenever an affidavit of bias or prejudice directed at a judge.., is filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 144, and the judge has determined that the affidavit is neither frivolous nor inter-
posed for delay, the judge may refer the determination of the sufficiency of the affidavit to
another judge selected at random.
However, some circuits discourage routine reassignment. See Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws
Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983). Occasionally, trial
judges themselves request that another member of their court rule on motions for disqualification.
See, eg., Bradley v. Milliken, 426 F. Supp. 929, 943-44 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1143 (6th
Cir.), cert denied on other issues, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
33. The same conservationist impulse animates managerial judging in the context of an indi-
vidual calendar system. In the federal courts, a specific judge is assigned a case at filing and super-
vises the progression of the case as well as adjudicates any contested issues. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
34. The decision (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255) to require federal prisoners to return to
the judge who imposed sentence to challenge the conviction or sentence was justified, in part, by the
desire to avoid having a trial judge testify "as an ordinary witness" before another judge. REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE, SUBMITTED TO THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (June 7, 1943). The Committee's Chair, Judge John Parker, objected
to the "unseemly spectacle . . . of state trial judges appearing [in federal courts] as witnesses in
defense of the proceedings" in their courts. Parker, Limiting theAbuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D.
171, 172-73 (1949).
Judges can play two roles as witnesses, delineated in the law as "material" and "character"
witnesses. If a judge knows that he or she will be called as a material witness, then a judge is
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by determining whether a judgment rendered in violation of § 455 should
be vacated upon consideration of "the risk of injustice to the parties in
the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice
in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the
judicial process."36 Further, the Supreme Court has been generally
supposed to recuse him or herself. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(1)(d)(iv). See gener-
ally Nebraska v. Barker, 227 Neb. 842, 420 N.W.2d 695 (1988). Yet, many court procedures -
including disqualification challenges and post-conviction attacks on verdicts - assign cases to judges
who have had familiarity with the prior proceedings. As one court explained its reasoning, the "trial
court, familiar with the prior proceedings, generally represents the better and more expeditious
forum." Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412, 417 (8th Cir. 1970). Tyler is a rare instance in which an
appellate court held that, when a trial judge's "recollection was the only testimony which refuted" a
litigant's claim and when the claim challenged the judge's conduct, another judge was required. Id.
In general, trial judges' explicit testimony is not required, but their implicit recollections are permit-
ted to affect the outcome. Again, in the words of the Tyler court, "a trial judge is not to be disquali-
fied simply because he is familiar with the proceedings and supplements the record with
observations." Id.
Canon 2(B) of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT addresses the role of judges as character
witnesses. The Canon states that a judge "should not testify voluntarily as a character witness."
The commentary explains that judicial testimony "injects the prestige of his offie.., and may be
misunderstood to be an official testimonial." American Bar Association, CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT (1984). In 1949, the American Bar Association debated legislative and ethical proposals to
immunize judges from responding to subpoenas. According to one member of the Special Commit-
tee formed to consider the issue, controversy arose when "two Justices of the Supreme Court
[appeared] as witnesses to the good character of Alger Hiss .... Statement of Kimbrough Stone,
Report of the Special Committee on the Propriety of Judges Appearing as Witnesses, 36 A.B.A. J. 630,
705 (1950). Stone argued that the appearance of a judge not only might be unduly protective of a
litigant but might also "lessen respect for the courts." Id. at 705 n. 9. The Committee concluded
that judges should not be protected from testifying but that "in any case counsel should refrain from
calling judges as witnesses, unless convinced that justice requires it." Id. at 702.
35. The grant or denial of disqualification motions are interlocutory orders and are therefore
not appealable as-of-right, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, unless understood to fall within the so-called
"Cohen" finality doctrine. Appellate courts have entertained appeals from judges who refuse to
disqualify themselves under "Cohen" finality, by way of mandamus or by certification pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). See Karen Nelson Moore, Appellate Review of Judicial Disqualification
Decisions in the Federal Courts, 35 HASTNGs L. REV. 829 (1984).
36. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 108 S. CL at 2204. In Liljeberg, a six per-
son majority upheld an appellate court that had vacated a district court judgment, issued by a judge
who had stated that he had not recalled that a university, upon whose Board of Trustees he sat, was
interested in a lawsuit which he had adjudicated. The Liljeberg majority opinion reviewed some of
section 455's mandatory provisions that require disqualification and the other provisions, under
which disqualification is required if a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28
U.S.C. section 455(a). The Court held that the case, which fell under the discretionary provisions,
was one in which there was "ample basis in the record for concluding that an objective observer
would have questioned" the trial judge's impartiality. Id. at 2203. The majority did not provide
detailed guidance for appellate courts on the general standard of review for section 455 proceedings
although the Court did hold that appellate court remedies of section 455 violations were entitled to
deference from the Supreme Court. Id.
Section 144 mandates disqualification if an affidavit passes tests of specificity and timeliness. 28
U.S.C. § 144 (1982). Prior to Liljeberg, appellate courts have described themselves as applying an
"abuse of discretion test" to the denial of a motion for disqualification under both § 144 and § 455.
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reluctant to base the definition of impermissible partiality on the Consti-
tution. As the Court has recently explained: "Certainly only in the most
extreme of cases would disqualification [on the basis of bias or favor] be
constitutionally required."
3 7
However justifiable (in some respects) the case might be for the chal-
lenged judge to rule on his or her partiality, the practice does not sit
comfortably with the image of the judge as disconnected, as having no
personal connection with a lawsuit. As the Supreme Court has
explained: "[N]o man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest
in the outcome."'38  While the standard explanation is that the word
"interest" does not mean the kind of "interest" at stake in disqualifica-
tion proceedings,39 challenges to impartiality go to a central aspect of a
judge's reputation. The word "interest" is sapped of one of its meaning if
we fail to acknowledge that judges are "interested" in at least some of the
instances when their capacity to judge is challenged.'
2. The Rule of Necessity: In Theory, Not a Share of Stock; In
Practice, One's Entire Salary
A second disjuncture between theory and practice comes under the
rubric of the "Rule of Necessity." When invoking this rule, judges
explain that, under ordinary rules of disqualification, they would be pro-
hibited from sitting in judgment, but under ordinary rules of judgment,
so would all other judges. Hence, because someone must judge, the
See, e.g., Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983).
37. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986).
38. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
39. According to one commentator, the common law recognized only one ground for disquali-
fication - financial "interest." Bias as a source of disqualification was a "complete departure from
common law principles." Frank, supra note 1, at 618-19, (relying in part on Blackstone's statement
that the "law will not suppose the possibility of bias or favor in a judge. . . ." 3 BLAcKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES 361).
40. I am not suggesting that judges care about the reassignment of every case before them or
about all of the grounds for disqualification. For instance, if a day after a case is assigned, a trial
judge finds that he or she is a shareholder in a company that is one of the litigants, reassignment
follows - presumably without much emotional investment. However, the case law demonstrates
that, in many instances, disqualification motions challenge an individual judge because of behavior
that he or she has engaged in and judges respond in ways that illustrate the emotions tapped by such
motions. See, e.g., Judge Higginbotham's eloquent discussion of racial discrimination in his denial of
a disqualification motion based on the grounds that, as a black jurist active in the civil rights move-
ment, he should not sit in judgment in a civil rights suit alleging racial discrimination. Pennsylvania
v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng's, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974). For the
subsequent history, see 569 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1983); 648 F.2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1981), and 458 U.S.
375 (1982).
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otherwise disqualified judges may sit.41 A classic example of the applica-
tion of the Rule of Necessity is United States v. Will. 2 At issue was the
question of whether Congress had violated Article III's guarantee that
federal judges' salaries not be diminished. Congress had enacted a
formula for annual cost of living increases which Congress subsequently
modified and repealed. 3
Of course, when deciding Will, federal judges had to take note of 28
U.S.C. section 455, which provides that federal judges may not sit on any
case in which they have a financial interest. Under the statute, "'finan-
cial interest' means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small .... ,44 The statute has been understood (to the dismay of some
judges and litigants) as mandating disqualification whenever a judge
owns a single share of stock in a corporation that is party to a lawsuit.45
In addition to this statutory interpretation, the question of judicial
participation in Will was one of constitutional dimension. While the
41. Some trace the Rule of Necessity to an English case, Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 10
Eng. Rep. 301, III H.L. 759 (1852), in which Lord Chancellor Cottenham, who held shares in the
company that was one of the litigants, justified his participation in a lawsuit "on the ground of
necessity, saying that unless the cause could be heard as it had been there would be a failure of
justice." Id. at 768. The Vice-Chancellor had decided the case, and the Lord Chancellor affirmed.
The House of Lords concluded that the Lord Chancellor was disqualified from deciding the merits of
the case but was, by necessity, qualified to "enrol the decree" and thereby enable the appeal. Id.
42. 449 U.S. 200 (1980). Justice Blackmun did not participate and, as is the custom, did not
explain his recusal. Other examples of the invocation of the Rule of Necessity include Evans v.
Gore, 235 U.S. 245 (1920) (constitutional question of whether federal judges' salaries could be
taxed); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979) (federal judges sued to enjoin
enforcement of portions of the Ethics in Government Act that require federal judges to file personal
financial reports), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (consolidated cases brought by 140 federal judges suing for salary compensation), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
43. 449 U.S. at 202.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (b), (d)(4).
45. The American Bar Association's House of Delegates has approved a proposed amendment
to § 455. The recommendation is to provide that:
[a] judge need not disqualify himself because he or a member of his family is a member of a
class in a class action unless they have a financial interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the litigation; and (ii) another judge may be appointed to deter-
mine whether the financial interest of the judge involved is so substantial that he should be
disqualified.
Report No. 123D, recommended by the Antitrust Section, as amended (on file with the author). The
proposal was accompanied by commentary citing, as one horror story, In re Cement and Concrete
Antitrust Litigation, 515 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Ariz. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), for
want of a quorum, aff'd as if the Court were equally divided, sub nom. Arizona v. United States
District Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983). In that case, a trial judge had presided over the litigation for
years when it was discovered that the judge's wife was a shareholder in one corporation that was one
member of several consolidated class actions. The judge then recused himself and noted that his
potential benefit from the lawsuit was less than $30.
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Supreme Court has not spoken often about the constitutional elements of
judicial qualifications, the Court has heard several challenges to judges
who have some monetary stake in an outcome. For example, a mayor of
a town who also sat as a justice of the peace was disqualified from judg-
ing because traffic fines augmented the town's revenues." Members of a
professional licensing board have been barred from judging that profes-
sion's competitors. 47 More recently, in Aetna Life Insurance Company v.
Lavoie," the Supreme Court held that a state court justice was constitu-
tionally barred from participating in judging a bad-faith insurance claim
because the justice was also a plaintiff against an insurance company in
another bad faith refusal-to-pay case.49 While the Court was careful to
distinguish the constitutional rule, applied in Lavoie, from the de minimis
pecuniary interest rule represented in the federal disqualification stat-
ute,"0 both the case and the statute point to the same concern: Judges'
economic stakes in cases render suspect judicial abilities to "hold the bal-
ance nice, clear and true.",
5 1
If a share of stock represents the kind of personal stake prohibited
by statute, and if the status of being a plaintiff in a lawsuit that would be
affected by a ruling in another case represents a constitutional bar to
adjudicating, how could any federal judge decide the question of whether
Congress has impermissibly lowered the salaries of federal judges? How
could federal judges be conceived of as "neutral and detached"? 52 Why
turn to a "Rule of Necessity"? Why not create rules of transfer to less
interested judges? To state court judges? To Article I judges? To a spe-
cial master, or to a specially created ad hoc court? Such delegation has
been done in the federal courts,5 3 upon occasion, and has also been done
46. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
47. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
48. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
49. Id. at 824-25.
50. Id. at n 3. Cf. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977) (payment of $5 fee for
issuance of search warrant to justice of peace violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; the
de minimis character of the payment did not redeem it).
51. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972), quoted in Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822.
The majority's ruling in Lavoie is quite narrow. The majority held that, because the case was 5-4
and the justice challenged had written the opinion, the judgment had to be vacated. The concurring
opinions, one by Justice Brennan (475 U.S. at 829) and the other by Justice Blackmun (475 U.S. at
831) in which Justice Marshall joined, urged a broader ruling. They argued that, because the process
in a multi-judge court is corrupted when one of the members of the court is biased, its judgments
must be vacated.
52. Ward, 409 U.S. at 62.
53. See, eg., Sup. Ct. R. 9.2 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (special masters); ExParte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1 (1942) (Court approved the appointment of an ad hoc military tribunal to try alleged German
saboteurs - even though the federal courts were functioning). In addition to the creation of ad hoc
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in various state systems.54
courts, the federal system has a mechanism for reconstituting the United States Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 2109 provides that, when a quorum of six justices is unavailable and an appeal comes
directly from a district court, the Supreme Court may "remit" the case to the circuit in which the
case arose - to be heard either by the circuit court en bane or by a specially-constituted appellate
court comprised of that circuit's three most senior judges. That court's decision is to be "final and
conclusive". Section 2109's predecessor provided for appeals in equity cases but did not include any
mechanism for replacing the Supreme Court if it could not sit. See Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32
Stat. 823. That statute was amended in June of 1944 in response to the problems faced by the Court
when it lacked a quorum to decide an anti-trust case. See Act of June 9, 1944, 58 Stat. 272, codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 29. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F.Supp 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1941), app'd, 320 U.S. 708 (1943) (held on special docket for lack of quorum), certified and trans-
ferred, 322 U.S. 716 (1944), aff'd in part and rev. in part, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (by Second
Circuit judges Learned Hand, Thomas Swan and Augustus Hand), petition for mandamus dismissed
for want of jurisdiction sub nom United States v. Caffey, 164 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1947), rev., sub nom
United States v. United States District Court, 334 U.S. 258 (1948) (by which time the Court had
sufficient members to hear the case).
Section 2109 also provides for cases brought to the Supreme Court from the state or federal
appellate courts; in those cases the Court may either put the case over for a term or affirm as if the
Court were equally divided. See Prichard v. United States, 339 U.S. 974 (1950); Sloan v. Nixon, 419
U.S. 958 (1974); the related cases of Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983) and
Arizona v. U.S. District Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983); Haig v. Bissonette, 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.
1986), aff'd without a quorum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2109, 108 S. Ct. 1253 (1988). When the
respondents in Bissonette requested a rehearing after that case was affirmed, they argued that the
requirement of a quorum and the application of § 2109 to their case were unconstitutional. Respon-
dents' Petition to Reconsider (Motion for Rehearing), Haig v. Bissonette, No. 86-987, at 17-25 (on
file with the author). The Court denied the application for a rehearing; once again, the members that
had recused themselves declined to participate. Once More, With Gusto, Legal Times of Washing-
ton, May 23, 1988 at 6, col. 2.
In a few lower federal court cases, in which federal judges have been named as defendants, one
or more judges from outside the circuit or district have been designated, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 291, to hear the case. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1987) (prosecution
of Walter L. Nixon, Chief Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 749
(1988); Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1985), modified, 778 F.2d 553 (10 Cir. 1985)
(prosecution of Fred M. Winner, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado), vacated and remanded, sub nom. Tyus v. Martinez, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986); United States
v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.) (prosecution of Otto Kerner, then a judge on the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit), cerL denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
In some of these designation cases, the designated judges invoke the Rule of Necessity to
explain why, despite their otherwise impermissible "interest," they may nevertheless sit. See, e.g., In
re Petition to Inspect & Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1261, 1266 (1lth Cir.) (judicial mis-
conduct investigation of federal district judge Alcee Hastings; panel of appellate judges from the
First, Second, and Seventh Circuits), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); Pilla v. American Bar Ass'n,
542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (claiming the right to be represented by lay counsel, plaintiffs sued the
American Bar Association, the Chief Justice and four justices of the United States Supreme Court,
all federal circuit judges, most of the district judges in the Eighth Circuit, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, and others; appeal heard by one Eighth circuit judge and two designated judges, one from the
Eastern District of Michigan and one from the United States Court of Custom and Patent Appeals).
For a discussion of the powers of specially designated judges to hear petitions for rehearing, com-
pare, Isaacs, 493 U.S. at 1138, and Martinez, 778 F.2d at 553, with Nixon, 827 F.2d at 1019.
54. See, e.g., Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 ("Special Supreme Court of Texas, May 24,
1925"), discussed infra notes 56, 234-35, and accompanying text.
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In Will itself, the Court did not explore such alternatives. Reading
congressional silence on the question of invoking "the ancient Rule" as
affirming the validity of the Rule of Necessity, the Court proceeded to
the merits. The Court justified its decision by invoking the public inter-
est: "The public might be denied resolution of this crucial matter if...
[the] Court [were to] ... ignore the mandate of the Rule of Necessity and
decline to answer the question presented.""5
Note that the Court had another alternative: The justices could
have commented that no one is truly disinterested, that judges must
always separate themselves from their "interest" in the cases before
them, and that a "Rule of Necessity" operates at some level in every case.
But "Rule of Necessity" explanations are not invoked to demonstrate
that we are all linked in a fashion that renders the notion of complete
disinterest functionally impossible. Rather, when embracing the "Rule
of Necessity", judges acknowledge that, under current standards, they
are so situated that their judgments could fairly be questioned as biased
and self-serving. Nonetheless, these judges give themselves the permis-
sion to judge.
Of course, one can find justifications for reliance on the Rule of
Necessity. To judge is to exercise power. Judicial creation of the Rule of
Necessity maintains judicial authority, while judicial exercise of doc-
trines of delegation recognizes - indeed confers - authority on others.
For example, in 1925, all the members of the Supreme Court of Texas
acknowledged that they were prevented, by reason of membership in a
fraternal organization, Woodmen of the World, from deciding a lawsuit;
the Texas governor then appointed an ad hoc court. For a moment,
three women sat as "Special Associate Justices" and held the power of
the Texas Supreme Court.56 See Figure 1. The regular judges were dis-
placed, albeit briefly, and others stood in their stead.
55. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217. On the merits, the Court held that some of the
salary decreases were permissible while others were not - in essence enabling both sides to win on
some points. Id. at 229.
56. Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 (Tex. 1925). According to the reporter's note: "All mem-
bers of the Supreme Court were disqualified to sit in this case, and so certified their disqualification
to the Governor of the state, whereupon [under statutory authority], the Governor appointed a
Special Supreme Court, consisting of three women, Mrs. Hortense Ward, Special Chief Justice, and
Miss Ruth Virginia Brazzil and Miss Hattie L. Henenberg, Special Associate Justices, to hear and
determine the issues." Id. According to a contemporary report, the women took the oath of office,
but none "of the women raised her right hand, as is customary among men taking an oath of office.
They did not seem to be flurried by the experience." The Texas Law Student at 3 (April 1, 1925).
Woodmen of the World is and was a mutual insurance company that grew out of Modern
Woodmen of America, founded in 1882. Woodmen of the World gives "June 6, 1890 [as] the birth
of the new order," Sovereign Camp of the World, Modern Woodmen of America. In some states,
1894
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Figure 1
Hortense Ward, Hattie L. Henenberg, Ruth Brazzill, as the "Special
Supreme Court" of Texas. Photo reproduced with permission of the
Texas Supreme Court.
189519881
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Whether such a practice could be adopted in the federal system is
questionable; one might make constitutional arguments for the Rule of
Necessity. Can the federal courts be the final arbiters on the meaning of
the Constitution if other bodies were to decide even a single aspect of
constitutional law? Arguably, Article III itself forbids the conferring of
such power on others, although the federal courts have sanctioned many
delegations of Article III powers to non-Article III actors." But, such
explorations of constitutional issues and alternative judges are not com-
mon in federal judicial discussions of the Rule of Necessity. 8 Rather,
when faced with situations such as Will, many judges simply invoke the
Rule of Necessity and seem to rest upon it comfortably.
3. Timing is Critical
A formal description of the received tradition suggests that ques-
tions of impartiality, independence, and disengagement are eternal ones
the organization is known as Omaha Woodmen. See A Brief History of Fraternalism and The
Woodmen (pamphlet on file with the author). Woodmen of the World has affected judicial disquali-
fication in other states as well. See Woodmen of the World v. Alford, 206 Ala. 18, 89 So. 528 (1921).
The current provision in Texas for the creation of a special court is § 22.005 of Texas Code
Annotated (Vernon 1987) (formerly codified at § 1717, and prior to that, at § 1517). Other Texas
cases invoking § 22.005 or its predecessor include: Cousins v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the
World, 120 Tex. 107, 35 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Ellis v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 118
Tex. 224, 13 S.W.2d 666 (1929); Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Patton, 117 Tex. 1, 295
S.W. 913 (1927), Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Boden, 117 Tex. 229, 1 S.W.2d 256
(1927); Bailey v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 116 Tex. 160, 286 S.W. 913 (1927);
Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Ayers, 113 Tex. 564, 261 S.W. 1000 (1924); Hutcherson
v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 112 Tex. 551, 251 S.W. 491 (1923); Sovereign Camp,
Woodmen of the World v. Hale, 56 Tex.Civ.App 447, 120 S.W. 539 (1909).
In the spring of 1988, the Texas Supreme Court requested a replacement judge to break a tie
resulting from a split vote in the appeal of Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d
761 (1986). Fred Bonavita, Clements Asked to Help in HL&P Case, Houston Post, June 4, 1988, at
14A. For discussion of disqualification law in general in Texas, see William W. Kilgarin & Jennifer
Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, 17 ST. MARY'S L. J. 599 (1986) and Rules 18a and
18b of the Texas Rules of Court (1988). My thanks to Pat Cain, for bringing the Texas practice to
my attention, and to Chief Justice Thomas R.Phillips of the Texas Supreme Court and William
Willis on the court's staff, for the provision of information on Texas cases.
Other states also have provisions for the appointment of special judges. See, e.g., Tenn. Const.
art. 6, § 11; Del. Const. art. 4, § 12, and infra notes 234-35, and accompanying text.
57. See generally Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L.
Rav. 581 (1985).
58. As noted, lower federal courts do not always rely on the Rule of Necessity. The federal
courts have used replacement judges - either from other circuits or districts or judges who have
taken senior status - in instances when a member of a particular district or circuit is indicted. See.
eg., United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (judges from the Third, Sixth and Eighth Circuits sat
by designation to hear the proceedings against Harry Claiborne, a judge on the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Nevada), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984). See also the cases cited in
note 53 supra.
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that can always be asked - or, in the language of procedure, are "juris-
dictional." In theory, the absence of these treasured attributes should
lead to disqualification. Ideally, such disqualification would occur prior
to judgment but, if the impermissible qualities are found subsequent to
judgment, then the judgments would be nullified.
However, several pockets of disqualification law have rules that
teach otherwise. For example, one of the federal disqualification statutes
speaks of the requirement that litigants file a "timely" affidavit seeking
recusal; some courts have barred attempts to obtain disqualification as
belated.59 A second illustration comes from habeas corpus litigation, in
which claims of biased judging are made, often in the context of chal-
lenges to a jury's verdict. While distinctions can be drawn between the
societal expectations of judges and of jurors,' ° cases involving jurors,
who temporarily hold the power to judge, are an important source of
information about the "law" of impartiality. Indeed, the Constitution's
text imposes the obligation of impartiality upon jurors in criminal cases,
but does not otherwise mention the term impartiality.61 The law devel-
oped in this area is highly protective of those who have rendered judg-
ment. Once a verdict is entered, presumptions of finality insulate
decision-makers from challenges to their fairness. Further, when state
prisoners' claims of bias are raised by way of habeas corpus, presump-
tions of correctness attach to prior state court "findings" on the issue of
bias, which is either viewed as a question of fact or as a mixed question of
fact and law.6" Under this approach, a variety of challenges to the
impartiality of juries have been rejected.63
59. 28 U.S.C. § 144. In many instances, the timeliness requirement of § 144 has not func-
tioned as an absolute bar; rather, courts note the failure to file in a timely manner and then proceed
to discuss the merits of the claim as well. See, eg., United States v. Branco, 798 F.2d 1302, 1304-05
(9th Cir. 1986); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1233-35 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Stud-
ley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1978)
(accommodation between competing interests of avoiding abuse and avoiding the appearance of
impropriety require consideration of the motion for recusal).
60. For example, jurors work in groups and are not required to give reasons for their
judgments.
61. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides criminal defendants with a right to
trial by an "impartial jury." According to the Supreme Court, the right to an impartial judge comes
from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of no deprivations of life, liberty or property
without "due process of law." See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ("The Due Process
Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.").
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (state court findings entitled to a "presumption of correctness");
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (federal court must accord presumption of correctness to
state court findings that prospective juror was not biased).
63. See also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (presumption of correctness attached to
state court findings of the propriety of permitting a juror to participate); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S.
114 (1983) (conviction upheld despite ex parte communication between juror and judge); Smith v.
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Once again, one can understand the impulse for insulation of the
judgments rendered. In a world in which all subsequent challenges to
verdicts were permitted, cases could (at least in theory) go on and on. In
fact, many people convicted of crimes do not challenge the verdicts ren-
dered;" we can only surmise about the impact of liberalization of the
rules. But whatever the empirical validity for our psychological and
political drives towards closure, the point is that the kind of disconnec-
tion claimed to be required in theory is not enforced in fact. We give the
force of law to judgments rendered by individuals who have had connec-
tions to litigants or have had prior experiences relevant to the case at
issue.
4. Sources of Knowledge
A final example of the tensions between rhetoric and practice comes
from the rules about sources of taint. As is the case with the relationship
between the timing of challenges to impartiality and the voiding of judg-
ments, one might have assumed that prejudicial information is prejudi-
cial information, that if judges learn facts that might lead them from
dispassion to passion, from competent to incompetent judging, then dis-
qualification must follow.
However, the law of disqualification has distinguished among
sources of knowledge and has voided verdicts or disqualified judges only
under limited circumstances. First, the courts have imposed require-
ments about the source and nature of a challenge; courts refuse to listen
to complaints about incompetence to judge that come from certain peo-
ple. Second, courts have drawn lines based upon the places in which the
allegedly prejudicial information is learned. If judges learn prejudicial
information "extrajudicially," disqualification may follow, while the
same information, if obtained within the courtroom, is not the basis for
disqualification.
The first problem - the wrong source - is illustrated by Tanner v.
United States,65 a recent Supreme Court case involving a challenge to a
jury's verdict. Anthony R. Tanner and William M. Conover were con-
victed of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Prior to sentencing,
they sought an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether some of
the jurors were so intoxicated and drugged that their verdict should be
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (conviction upheld despite fact that juror applied for job at prosecutor's
office during pendency of case).
64. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAt. L. REv. 837, 939-48 (1984).
65. 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987).
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set aside. As the dissenters tell the story, two jurors accused the others of
"rampant drug and alcohol abuse."' 66
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of an inquiry
into the validity of the verdict. As Justice O'Connor explained for the
Court, the common law had a rule that permitted impeachment of a
juror's verdict only by virtue of "extraneous influence ' 67 - that is, mat-
ters outside, rather than inside, the jury room. According to the Court,
this "external/internal distinction" was not rigid in a "physical sense.
' '6
A newspaper read inside the jury room could be an "external" source,
while accusations of misunderstanding of a judge's charge, in the court-
room, was an "internal" challenge.69 The question turned "on the nature
of the allegation."70
The line drawing deteriorated as the Court tried to explain why it
refused to hear co-jurors' claims that their colleagues had been drunk.
The majority noted that many federal courts had treated allegations of
physical or mental incompetence of a juror as an "internal" (ergo non-
cognizable) rather than "external" claim.71 Thereafter, the Court
described the importance of the finality of verdicts and the other means,
such as the voir dire and direct judicial observation of jurors, to protect
against juror impairment. The Court then rejected the defendants' chal-
lenge - under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and under the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of an "impartial" and implicitly competent jury.
Confusion comes, however, from the Court's comment that the defend-
ants had "ample opportunity to produce nonjuror evidence" of jury
impairment. 72 If the critical touchstone is the "nature" of the allegation,
and if drug impairment is an "internal" challenge, how could testimony
by non-jurors about drug impairment render the challenge "external"
and therefore cognizable? As the Court applied its own test, disallow-
ance was based on the source of the challenge - co-jurors - rather than
the nature of the challenge - the alleged drunkenness of some of the
challenged jurors.
While the Court's articulation of its test is wanting, the Court's
efforts to insulate jury verdicts reflect concerns about the need to protect
both judgments and those who judge. The Tanner case is one of several
66. Id. at 2755.
67. Id. at 2746 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892)).




72. Id. at 2751.
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demonstrating the Court's commitment to finality in criminal cases -
and elsewhere.73 Moreover, when the Court invoked the slippery slope
of unhappy jurors' impeachment of verdicts, the Court relied upon oft-
stated fears of chilling jury deliberations and of revealing the fallibility of
human deliberative processes.74 One might agree with the dissenters that
distinctions can be drawn between claims of drunken and drugged delib-
erations and those of divisive deliberations, 7 but the majority's desire to
protect verdicts has a long tradition of coexistence with a rhetoric that
demands impartiality and deliberate judgment.76
The external/internal distinction drawn in Tanner bears some
resemblance to a second distinction drawn - between impermissible
"extrajudicial" knowledge and permissible information, gained during
the course of a lawsuit. Illustrative here is the prohibition, in one of the
federal disqualification statutes, against decision-making by judges with
"personal knowledge" of the dispute.77 Personal knowledge, that which
comes to a judge from any place other than the litigation, can be the basis
for disqualification. Several arguments are offered in support of such dis-
qualification - that the information gained may be incomplete or inac-
curate, that litigants may not know that a judge possesses some
knowledge that could be critical to judgment, and that the information
may close a judge's mind to contrary data.
An example comes from a lawsuit filed under Title VII by Bernice
Roberts. She alleged that her superior, Benjamin Bailar, had discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex and prevented her promotion in the post office.
The trial judge stated that he knew the postmaster who was the defend-
ant, and knew he was "an honorable man... [who] would never inten-
tionally discriminate against anybody."'78 Here was a judge who said
that he drew upon extrajudicial knowledge. Perhaps his information was
incomplete, perhaps not accurate, perhaps preclusive of equal treatment,
perhaps limiting the judge's ability to hear contrary data. The trial judge
refused to disqualify himself, but the Court of Appeals reversed.79
73. See generally Resnik, Tiers, supra note 64, at 1005-28.
74. Tanner, 107 S. Ct. at 2748.
75. Id. at 2758.
76. See, eg., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 ( 1915); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140
(1892). Both cases left open the possibility of revising jury verdicts while explaining presumptions
against entertaining such challenges. "But cases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse
[juror impeachment] without violating the plainest principles of justice." Mattox, 146 U.S. at 148.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
78. Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 129-30.
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Imagine a slight variation in the facts: Assume that the trial judge
had made the same comments, but not based upon his "personal,"
"extrajudicial" knowledge of the individual. Instead, assume that the
judge offered a casual comment after the postmaster had completed his
direct testimony at trial. "Seems like an honorable man to me; hard to
believe he would ever intentionally discriminate against anybody." Or
alter the hypothetical once again. Imagine that the judge ruled: "I
hereby find that the postmaster is an honorable fellow and that he did not
intentionally discriminate against anyone."
The judgments made in the two hypotheticals may be as reliable or
as faulty as that made "extrajudicially," but few challenges will be cogni-
zable under either set of hypothetical facts. Extrajudicial sources of prej-
udice are sufficient to disqualify, but judicial sources of prejudice are
generally not the basis for disqualification.8" "[F]acts learned by a judge
in his judicial capacity cannot be the basis for disqualification."'" More-
over, even if a plaintiff successfully challenged the hypothetical verdict,
and, on appeal, the facts were found to have been "clearly erroneous,"82
the custom throughout most of the federal system is that an appellate
court returns the case to the very judge who had made the "clearly erro-
neous" finding.83 Being wrong does not disqualify a judge from judging
the same case again.
80. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) ("The alleged bias and prejudice
to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case."). See also Parker v.
New England Oil Corp., 13 F.2d 497, 498 (D. Mass. 1926) (a judicial opinion of the defendant, based
on evidence offered in a prior case to which defendant was not a party, does not constitute personal
bias or prejudice).
81. United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931
(1977). See also United States v. Johnson, 658 F.2d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1981) (trial court's in
camera inspection of documents, allegedly prejudicial to defendant, did not provide extrajudicial
information).
82. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
83. See David L. Ratner, Disqualification of Judges for Prior Judicial Actions, 3 Howard L. J.
228 (1957); In re Federal Facilities Reality Trust, 140 F. Supp. 522, 524, 527 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (trial
judge explained "that I was mistaken has been made painfully apparent" by the appellate court's
reversal but refused to recuse himself). See also United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 505 (D. Del.
1981) (judge declined to recuse himself even though he had ruled on the credibility of the defendant
who had testified in an unrelated proceeding).
Local rules often govern these issues. Local Court Rule 42, "Remand by an Appellate Court,"
of the Southern District of New York provides for return of a matter remanded from the Court of
Appeals to the judge "who heard the cause or matter below unless the appellate court otherwise
directs." Rule 22(a) of the Local Rules for the Federal District of Connecticut states: remands in
which "further proceedings not requiring the trial of an issue of fact are appropriate ... shall be
referred ... to the Judge who heard the.., matter below unless the Chief Judge or appellate court
otherwise directs". Occasionally, remand is made to a different judge. See, eg., United States v.
Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1982) (remand to a different judge for resentencing, in light of
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As in the previous examples, several justifications can be offered for
the current practice. Information is needed for decision; all information
that leads to judgment is by definition prejudicial to one party or the
other. The boundaries of a lawsuit create some means by which to screen
information and to provide litigants with the ability to challenge, as
flawed, the claims offered by an opponent. Judges should not be so ham-
strung that they cannot respond to the information provided. Hence,
judicial comments during proceedings can rarely be the basis for disqual-
ification. Further, to require new judges for each reversal would be
wasteful of court resources. Repeat adjudication (by judges,14 but not
generally by jurors") is one way to economize. Moreover, at least in
theory, evidence of judicial commentary that indicates impermissible bias
can result in reversal if reviewed by an appellate court.86
"unusual circumstances"); Bradley v. Milliken, 495 F. Supp 217 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (given bitterness
in school desegregation case, district judge, at the "suggestion" of the appellate court, reassigned the
case to another judge). For criticisms of appellate court remands to another judge as disruptive of
trial court workload assignments and harmful to morale, see Jack B. Weinstein, The Limited Power
of the Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 120 F.R.D.
267 (1988).
84. This rule has some texture. In addition to the exceptions listed in footnote 83, supra,
judges are not supposed to preside in the appeal from cases they decided while on a lower court, see
28 U.S.C. § 47, although as mentioned, judges are often permitted to reconsider cases when reversed
by a superior court. See William Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Bldg Co. v. Int'l Curtiss Marine
Turbine Co., 228 U.S. 645 (1913); Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339 (1913);
Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153 (1899). But note the view of Learned Hand, who wrote for a
panel including Judges Swan and Chase, that:
[t]here is no inherent reason to deny power to a judicial officer to review his own judg-
ments, even though they be final and decide the very merits of the cause; at common law
this was permissible .... Rightly or wrongly, judges are credited pro tanto with enough
detachment to be able to reexamine impartially what they have done ....
Henry v. Hodges, 171 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1948) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 968
(1949).
85. See, e-g., Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544, 545 (1964) (per curiam opinion noted
that "[p]rospective jurors [who] have ... heard a verdict returned against a man charged with a
crime in a similar case... should be automatically disqualified."); United States v. Franklin, 700
F.2d 1241, 1242 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Jurors who have served... on cases involving similar legal or
factual issues... can be dismissed for cause."); Donovan v. Davis, 558 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1977) (fair
trial denied if jurors serve on two cases involving the same defendant); Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551
F. 2d 553 (3d Cir. 1977) (defendant has constitutional right not to be tried by jurors who sat on the
previous panel). Cf. United States v. Loucas, 629 F.2d 989, 992 (4th Cir. 1980) (verdict upheld
despite fact that four jurors had sat on other gambling prosecution cases), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030
(1981) ; United States v. Carranza, 583 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1978) (defendant not deprived of his
right to a fair trial, even though some of the jurors had participated in similar cases and heard some
of the same witnesses).
86. United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 273 (1986)
(although no actual bias was found, trial judge had become so much a participant in the proceedings
that defendants were deprived of fair trial). But see Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S.
18, 55 (1981) (trial judge's ruling upheld despite his statement that he did not like "to be in the same
room" as the woman defending her parental rights).
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The difficulty with the line drawing - "internal/external," "extra-
judicial/judicial" - is that the arguments advanced for such lines clash
with our understanding of human cognition. A judge who has listened to
a trial, thought about the testimony, and written findings of fact and con-
clusions of law cannot comfortably be characterized as having no views
about that case, when it is returned upon remand. Resort to role offers
one possible explanation. As noted above, repeat adjudication by judges
is tolerated far more than is repeat adjudication by jurors. The theory is
that the judge, as a long term incumbent of the judicial role, has the
capacity to think anew, while jurors, briefly in role, have a weaker social-
ization to guide their thoughts.8 7 But social scientists have taught us that
our controls over cognitive capacities are limited. Vivid information may
impress us greatly while more subtle data can be lost."8 We construct
"schema" and "scripts" to aid us in digesting information, and it is not
so clear that we can will away the views held. 9 In short, while prejudg-
ment is always a danger, the problem seems particularly acute when
someone has already undertaken the responsibility to judge. Sometimes
the law bans further participation by the original adjudicator while, in
other instances, the law permits such an adjudicator to continue to
render judgment.
B. ANOTHER LEVEL OF THE REALITY: INSTITUTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION ABOUNDS
I have provided illustrations of the distance between stated aspira-
tions for judges and application of those aspirations to factual situations.
The disparity between rhetoric and reality extends beyond these specific
instances and provides the basis for a structural critique. The require-
ment of fair judging is to treat individuals without regard to status, race,
gender, or class. But social scientists have documented widespread insti-
tutional discrimination based upon race and sex.
For example, "[r]acial minorities receive disproportionately stiffer
sentences for comparable crimes .... "9o The Supreme Court recently
decided to ignore such disparity in the context of the death penalty; the
87. See generally Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie MeSpadden Wenner, and Manfred W. Wenner,
The Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note, 14 AM. J. OF POL. Scm. 277 (1975).
88. RICHARD NISBETr AND LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOM-
INGS OR SOCIAL JUDGMENT, 43-65 (1980).
89. Id. at 17-42.
90. Rose Matsui Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, 24 JUDGES' J. 5, 6-7
(Winter 1985).
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Court stated that, were it to acknowledge racial prejudice in death-sen-
tence cases, the Court would be required to consider racism elsewhere in
sentencing.91 Unwilling to think about institutional racism, the Court
required challenges based upon prejudice to be founded on proof of spe-
cific racial prejudice against the individual sentenced to death.92
A second example is discrimination based on sex. Over the past few
years, states have commissioned studies of how women fare in courts.
The findings - across jurisdictional boundaries - have been notably
uniform: Women are stereotyped and disadvantaged when they appear
as litigants, witnesses, or lawyers.93 The Report of the New York Task
Force on Women in the Courts is illustrative. The task force concluded
that "gender bias against women... is a pervasive problem with grave
consequences.... Cultural stereotypes of women's role in marriage and
in society daily distort courts' application of substantive law. Women
uniquely, disproportionately and with unacceptable frequency must
endure a climate of condescension, indifference and hostility."94 The
documentation provided by New York, New Jersey, and the other states
now considering the issue paints a picture of partiality, of prejudgment,
of judges ready to translate racial and sexist views into law.
C. Is THERE A PROBLEM?
I have provided just a few of the many examples of the tension
between the formal expectations of judges and practice. While we
demand impartiality, disengagement, dispassion, and lack of interest, we
live with outcomes that have been rendered by those who do not - at
least as currently understood - display these qualities. While one might
have thought that this longstanding gulf between stated aspirations and
reality would have transformed the statement of aspirations, the buzz
words of judging have proven remarkably resilient. Courts and commen-
tators continue to invoke the formal requirements while both condoning
91. McClesky v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1779 (1987).
92. Id. at 1798-1803.
93. See Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
15 (1986-87) [hereinafter New York Task Force]; First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court
Task Force on Women in the Courts (1984); The Second Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court
Task Force on Women in the Courts (1986). See also Sandy Karlan, Towards the Elimination of
Gender Bias in the Florida Courts, 11 NOVA L. REV. 1569 (1987); Marilyn Loftus, Lynn Hecht
Schafran, and Norma Winkler, Establishing a Gender Bias Task Force, 4 LAw & INEQUALITY 103
(1986). A comparable effort is underway in California. Telephone interview with Sheila Kuehl,
member of the executive committee of the Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts of the
Judicial Council of California's Administrative Office of the Courts (Winter, 1988).
94. New York Task Force, supra note 93, at 17-18.
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and bemoaning the departures from them.95
Is our legal tradition impoverished by chanting incantations that we
often do not and cannot expect to be fulfilled? One might argue that the
formal requirements serve a valuable function even if not mirrored by
practice.96 I find such responses inadequate. As Martha Minow has
recently explained, what she terms the "assumption" (and what I would
call the current definition) of impartiality is false, for it is based upon the
idea of an "observer who (in fact) sees from an unacknowledged perspec-
tive.... This aspiration to impartiality... is just that - an aspiration
rather than a description - because it may suppress the inevitability of
the existence of a perspective. . ."' Once we understand that there is
no "objective stance"98 but only a series of perspectives, we learn that
"[t]here is no neutrality, no escape from choice." 99
I began this essay with the question asked of then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Malcolm Lucas. The issue was whether he had "any precon-
ceived ideas about any issue" that might come before the Supreme Court
of California, and the response was that he had none.1" Both the ques-
tion and the answer make no sense at a factual level but must instead be
understood as ritual. The ritual is that, to become a judge, Malcolm
Lucas had to pretend to be other than human, to be an "observer without
perspective." As I noted at the outset, our tradition of judges evolved
from a belief in a god who judged, and then a king who judged as the
spokesman for a god -but over time, kings shed their godly claims and
judges strove to obtain independence from kings. In a secular system,
there is no escape from the fact that our judges are human, that we are
our judges. As I hope to show in the following sections, not only is there
no "escape from choice," there is also comfort in choice. We serve our
search for fair judgment better by embracing, rather than fleeing from,
the obligation of judgment.
95. See Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 249-52, 279-80, 283-86 for discussion and criticism of
these approaches.
96. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decisions Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in the
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984).
97. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 45 (1987).
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id. at 70.
100. Dan Morain, Lucas Sworn in as High Court Justice, L. A. Times, April 7, 1984, Part 2, at
1, col. 1.
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III. SOME FEMINIST APPROACHES
A. A QUESTION ABOUT THE QUESTION
A few introductory comments appropriately begin this section.
While this is not the occasion upon which to attempt to answer the
"what is feminism?" question, let me offer a bit of a framework for the
feminist theorizing that follows. Feminist theories share a view that
much of women's experiences of their lives has been omitted in the stan-
dard scholarly and popular descriptions of the world. A major shared
premise is that knowledge of the world is constructed from one's view-
point and that what has been assumed (by some) as a universal viewpoint
is, in fact, a viewpoint of some men, who have articulated a vision of
reality and claimed it to be true for us all.1" 1 Women's viewpoints have
been submerged, oppressed, invisible, and voiceless. A shared enterprise
of feminism is to bring those viewpoints forward for exploration and
consideration.
While feminists share an understanding of women's silence and a
belief that, with voice, women will emerge with distinctive contributions,
feminists do not have shared explanations of the sources of women's dif-
ferences from men. Many analyses of feminist theory conceptualize femi-
nist approaches in diverse ways.102 Those distinctions are not my
enterprise here, but again, by means of introduction, let me offer a few
examples. For some feminists with an anthropological or sociological
orientation, division of labor is a critical factor. Women have shouldered
most of the responsibility for caretaking and for the routine maintenance
of our lives, but, until recently, those experiences have not been seen as
101. See, ag., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 8-10; GILLIGAN, supra
note 2, at 18-23; West, supra note 2, at 1-4; GRIMSHAW, supra note 7, at 21, 70-71; BETTY FRIEDAN,
THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 15-32 (1963; 1983 ed.); Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equal-
ity, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 201, 201-208 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in
the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 29, 30-33 (1987). See
generally Women in Legal Education - Pedagogy, Law, Theory and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1
et seq. (1988).
102. See, e.g., JAGGER, supra note 7, whose book analyzes "liberal feminism," "radical femi-
nism," and "socialist feminism." West, supra note 2, at 13-38, discusses "cultural" and "radical"
feminists, as does Josephine Donovan in her book FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTELLECTUAL TRADI-
TIONS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 31-63, 141-169 (1985), while HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION,
supra note 7, at 141-162, draws distinctions based upon "feminist standpoint epistemologies". See
also Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory (Book Review of CATHARINE A. MACKINNON'S
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED), 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 827 (1988) ("Feminist legal theory has three
principal strands, ... 'difference', 'different voice', and 'dominance' approaches") (footnote omitted).
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relevant to political and social theory.103 For other feminists, more psy-
chodynamic in their concerns, women's distinct visions and practices
come from the unique relations of girls to their mothers, who have
responsibility for raising children of both sexes. The assumption is that
fundamentally differing processes of identity formation occur as girls and
boys separate themselves from their mothers."o Other feminist theorists
see differences between women and men as emanating from the political
structure of gender relations. Women's distinctions lie in their subordi-
nation; it is the absence of power that defines "women's ways."
10 5
Women of differing colors, class, and sexual orientation remind us that
an assumed universality of women's experiences is faulty.10 6 Class, race,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, as well as gender, suggest that no one per-
son has a single viewpoint. In Barrie Thorne's words, there are "inter-
secting viewpoints" within an individual her or himself.107
As is evident from this brief overview and as will be developed
below, feminism (among other approaches 08) raises an obvious, and in
some sense frightening challenge, to an ideology of judging that posits
103. See, eg., RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING, supra note 6; DOROTHY E. SMrTH, THE
EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC: A FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY, 1-44 (1987); and Nancy C. M.
Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism, (Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds.), DISCOVERING REALITY 283-310
(1983) (hereinafter DISCOVERING REALITY).
104. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A
Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in DISCOVERING REALITY, supra note
103, at 245-281.
105. Catharine MacKinnon is, in Cass Sunstein's words, "the most prominent and persistent
advocate for the dominance strand of feminist theory". Sunstein, supra note 102, at 829. See also
ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987).
106. See, eg., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); ANGELA
Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS (1983); THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS OF
RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (eds. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua 1983); MARY DALY,
GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM (1978); see also Susan N. G. Geiger,
Women's Life Histories: Method and Content, 11 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE &
SOCIETY 334 (1986); Laura Nader, The Subordination of Women in Comparative Perspective, 15
URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY 377 (1986).
107. Conversations with Barrie Thorne, Spring 1988. See also, Barrie Thome, Book Review, 12
AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1512 (1987) (reviewing SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEM-
INISM and EVELYN Fox KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE); SMITH, supra note
103, at 69-75; GRINSHAW, supra note 7, at 17-23 (dangers of "false universalism"). .,
108. See, e.g., SENNETr, supra note 23; Milner S. Ball, Humanizing Law, Book Review of
JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 547
(1988); and Justice Brennan's Cardoza Lecture, 42 RECORD OF THE ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 950 (Dec. 1987). See also "Doing Justice: Literary Texts, Humanistic Values,
and the Work of the Community Courts," a seminar for judges, described in Saul Touster, Parables
for Judges, 9 STATE COURT J. 10, 11 (Spring 1985).
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the judge as occupying some archimedian viewpoint.10 9 The question
asked of Justice Lucas - did he have any preconceived views? - is
revealed not as a quaint, if perfunctory, ritual but as a deceit. The Judge,
as Justitia, as Other, cannot be. A judge is either male or female and is of
a particular race, class, and social position; the appearance of neutrality,
of evenhandedness, of impartiality is false comfort.
When relying upon feminism as a mode of deconstruction, one
might be tempted to take the position that there can be no judges in a
feminist world. Feminist theorists might well reject the enterprise of
linking their approaches to the issue of judicial aspirations - might, to
borrow from Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "fight the hypothetical" 110 in at
least two ways. The first is to question directly the office of the judge.
Catharine MacKinnon has been a provocative spokeswoman for an
understanding that gender is itself constructed in a hierarchical world
run by men seeking to maintain their power."' The power invested in a
single judge - even given judicial dependence upon others to execute his
judgments - cannot be cabined by the niceties of seeking judges who are
impartial or, for that matter, who possess any other particular set of
characteristics. Rather than consider how to modify aspirations for
judges in light of feminist theory, one could challenge the very institu-
tions that create such hierarchical relationships. Governments depend
upon judges to assist in the maintenance of the status quo, marked by
exchanges between the powerful and the less powerful. Judges could be
understood as the paradigmatic actors of an established structure of
domination in which relationships are defined by one group holding
power continually over others. Of course, implicit in this analysis are
assumptions that hierarchy is intrinsic in adjudication and that hierarchy
is undesirable, and both assumptions merit exploration in their own
right.
Such a rejection of the office of the judge could lead to silencing
feminist reconsiderations of the judicial, and my choice to write this
paper demonstrates my view that bringing feminist voices to discussions
of judicial aspirations is worthwhile. My reasons are several. In this
109. The feminist challenge to law is similar to that posed to science. See HARDING, THE SCI-
ENCE QUESTION, supra note 7, 15-29.
110. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 46 (1985).
111. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 1-62; discussed in Katharine
T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1559 (1988). See
also Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 83 (1980).
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world, judges have power, and I have joined with other feminists in seek-
ing to enlist judicial assistance to obtain state recognition of the incur-
sions women suffer at the hands of the state and of others.112 While such
efforts may be temporary, pragmatic responses to the current power
structure, that structure is likely to be in place for some time. Moreover,
I am not convinced that adjudication and feminism are fundamentally
incompatible. Adjudication is one instance of governmental deployment
of power that has the potential for genuine contextualism, for taking seri-
ously the needs of the individuals affected by decisions and shaping deci-
sions accordingly.11  Precisely because adjudication is socially
embedded, it can be fluid and responsive. If we are able to reconceive the
judicial role, we may well help those empowered to judge to use their
powers in a way which we respect. Finally, power seems to me to be part
of human construction, and feminists must speak to power as well as
demand its reconstruction.' 
14
A second feminist challenge to the linking of feminism and judicial
aspirations is addressed not to the office of the judge but to the idea that
one can speak coherently about a single set of qualities demanded for the
vast array of roles and responsibilities that people called judges have.
Because many feminist theories are committed to contextualism, the
question of "what qualities are to be demanded of judges?" could be
inappropriate because one ought not to be seeking generic qualities in
judges. A judge who sits alone and decides criminal cases has a job dif-
ferent than that of a judge who sits as a member of a three-judge court,
specially convened to determine the constitutionality of a federal statute.
A judge who is a regular member of an appellate court of general juris-
diction does not have the same task as a trial judge with a delineated
jurisdiction; a judge on the highest court of the state or federal system is
112. See, e.g., California Federal v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct 683 (1986) (California's pregnancy disabil-
ity act does not violate federal law). Other feminist efforts include Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment), and Indianapolis City-County General Ordinance No. 35
(June 11, 1984) (held unconstitutional in American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v Hudnut, 598 F.Supp.
1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), summarily aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)). For a discussion of the "rights"
based approaches, see generally Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 1043 (1987); Martha Minow, Interpreting Right An Essay for Robert Cover, 96
YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Kim Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking
to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CiV. LiB. L. REv. 323
(1987).
113. See Karst, supra note 22, at 496-97.
114. See Diane Rothbard Margolis, Considering Women's Experience. A Reformulation of
Power Theory (manuscript on file with the author); and papers presented at the 1988 Feminism and
Legal Theory Conference: Women and Power, University of Wisconsin Law School, Institute for
Legal Studies (June 1988).
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cast in a role quite different from that of those hierarchically inferior.
Judicial tasks vary not only with the kind of court and number of judges,
but also with the nature of the cases and the degree of contact between a
judge and the community in which the court sits. Why should we
assume that even a small set of generic qualities can be required of all of
those who must undertake these varied tasks?
As I draw distinctions among kinds of judicial tasks, I note that they
sound at once so obvious and yet not so obvious. Of course, the roles of
the judges differ, and - one might be tempted to comment - one need
not introduce any new approach (feminist or otherwise) to make that
point. However, the literature on judging does not make much mention
of the distinctions among the tasks of judges.11 Indeed, Ronald Dwor-
kin's theories of adjudication posit a single judge, Hercules, as represen-
tative of all judges.I16 Robert Cover's work is an antidote, reminding us
that we need not assume forever that Hercules is a "he" (Cover's article
speaks instead of Hercules as a "she" 1 17) and that, for judicial interpreta-
tion to be transformed into action, judges must depend upon others. No
judge acts alone. No judge stands outside a social context.' 8
Thus, feminist theory may well clarify that to .ask about judicial
attributes is at some level misleading, since we must know more than the
label "judge" before we can draw a list of qualifications. But while such
a pull towards contextual particularity has much appeal, so does the urge
for the universal - for the constraining demand that all judicial power
be free of corruption, self-interest, and bias. Whether on family court or
tax court, at the trial or appellate level, judges should not be self-serving.
Moreover, perhaps the universal aspirations provide symbolic boundaries
that have protected us from judicial corruption. The claim could be
made that, whatever examples I provided above of the tensions between
aspirations and practice, the examples would be multiplied many times
over, were we to abandon the demands for universal judicial attributes of
disengagement and disinterest.
I have mixed feelings about arguments based upon the symbolic
function of such aspirations; our history is replete with the mouthing of
115. But see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Laurence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82
(1986) (discussing impact of group dynamics on appellate court decisionmaking).
116. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239 (1986) ("Call him Hercules"). See also RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1057 (1975).
117. Cover, Violence, supra note 5, at 1626.
118. Id. at 1627-28.
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words that are at stark variance from the behaviors sanctioned. 119 But
this paper need not resolve that debate. 2° Feminism may help us see
that what the universal aspirations are attempting to achieve may vary
from context to context, from small community to large urban setting,
from trial court to appellate court, from single judge to collective judges,
from commercial to constitutional law. If we understand feminist skepti-
cism not as rejecting all levels of generality but rather as reminding us of
the limits and risks of such generalizing, we gain in our ability to press
beyond the talisman-like phrases.
B. JUDICIAL ASPIRATIONS AND FEMINIST THEORIES
Below, I discuss the work of four feminists: Carol Gilligan, Robin
West, Sara Ruddick, and Rosemary Ruether. I have chosen feminists
working in different academic disciplines - psychology, law, philoso-
phy, and theology - to illustrate important convergences, as well as dif-
ferences, among feminist theories. While none of these authors are the
spokespersons for their respective disciplines, all provide insights that
help this effort to understand whether we can conceive of the attributes
of judges in any way other than that described above. While these
authors do not directly address the question of the attributes of judges,
each of the theorists considers the implications of feminism for those who
hold power. As in the first section of the paper, when I assumed that not
all readers were familiar with the law of judging, in this section I assume
some unfamiliarity with this feminist literature, and once again, I provide
brief summaries. My necessarily limited descriptions are just that -
sketches of much more nuanced and richer contributions.
1. Carol Gilligan and the Ethic of Caring
In 1982, Carol Gilligan wrote In a Different Voice, a book that has
struck a chord with many readers. Gilligan argues that discernible dif-
ferences exist in the ways in which females and males approach and
resolve situations of moral conflict. 12' Gilligan responded to a literature
119. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of
Japanese-Americans). See generally Matsuda, Minority Critique, Looking to the Bottom, supra note
112.
120. Cf. M. H. Hoeflich & Jan G. Deutsch, Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge, 6
HOFSrRA L. REV. 749, 750 (1978) ("the role of the disinterested judge, blind and to that extent
impartial with respect to differences that distinguish persons from each other, is a crucial component
of our societal stock of myths, and... it is social acceptance of this notion of blind judging that
legitimates and therefore maintains the judicial process.").
121. GILLIGAN, supra note 2, at 24-63, 128-174. As Carol Weisbrod points out, claims of differ-
ences in women's and men's approaches and attitudes have a long history. Women's exclusion from
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on theories of developmental psychology that was dominated by tests
and observations of boys and of men.122 Gilligan looked instead at the
comparison between girls and boys and between women and men. Gilli-
gan asked those whom she interviewed about their responses to moral
dilemmas, and she found that females dealt differently with conflictual
situations than did males. According to Gilligan, women tend to strive
to preserve relationships, 123 to empathize with a potential adversary,124
to have an ethic of caring that influences decisions about the justice of an
outcome. 125 Women's "identity is defined in a context of relationship
and judged by a standard of responsibility and care."' 126 Rather than
occupying a rung on a ladder of hierarchy, women take their place in a
web of relationships and seek to preserve the connections.1
27
An obvious issue is the source of the differences uncovered, and Gil-
ligan is not always clear on her theory of etiology. At times, she appears
to adopt Nancy Chodorow's psychoanalytic account that, because
women are the primary child caretakers, boys and girls have different
experiences in reaching adulthood. Oversimplified, the theory is that,
because their gender identity is not the same as their mothers, boys dis-
tance and separate themselves while girls, identifying with their mothers,
can achieve adulthood in a context of continuation and connection.
28
At other points, Gilligan appears to relate the ethic of care to women's
roles as currently structured.'29 Gilligan's findings may thus be cultur-
ally and time dependent in that if roles change, the moral approaches of
and inclusion on juries were explained by assumed differences between women's and men's judg-
ments. See Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1986); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (indictment dismissed under supervisory powers because the
exclusion of women from petit and grand jury panels was prejudicial); R. Justin Miller, The Woman
Juror, 2 OREGON L. REV. 30 (1922) (discussing a 1921 Oregon statute which required that at least
one half of the jurors be women when a minor was tried). The exclusion of women from juries was
eventually understood as violative of a defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a jury
comprised of a cross-section of the community. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
122. The central works that Gilligan criticized were a series of articles and books by Lawrence
Kohlberg, including The Development of Modes of Thinking and Choices in Years 10 to 16, Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958, and THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
(1981). For work before Gilligan's on gender differences, see ELEANOR EMMONS MACCOnY &
CAROL NAGY JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974).
123. GILLIGAN, supra note 2, at 28-32.
124. Id. at 50-63. See also MARY FIELD BELENKY, BLYTHE MCVICKER CLINCHY, NANCY
RULE GOLDBERGER, JILL MATrUCK TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING 116-118 (1986).
125. GILLIGAN, supra note 2, at 151-174.
126. Id. at 160.
127. Id. at 169-174.
128. Id. at 7-10. See CHODOROW, supra note 104.
129. GILLIGAN, supra note 2, at 158.
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women and men may also be altered.130  Moreover, to the extent
women's and men's differing ethics are interdependent, changes in one
would beget changes in the other.
13 1
Gilligan's work has sparked much comment, some of it critical.
132
Some have disputed the empirical validity of the conclusions drawn from
the data.133 Other theorists, including Catharine MacKinnon, have criti-
cized the interpretations offered. MacKinnon has argued that Gilligan
failed to recognize that ethics of caring and reliance upon relationships
(instead of upon rules) are artifacts of power. Those who have no power
have no capacity to make rule-based claims and instead are supplicants
to the empowered.
134
The importance of Gilligan's work stems, in part, from the power of
her metaphor. Women's "voices" have not been much heard in the law.
While initial feminist approaches were assimilationist 135 and sought
access to and inclusion in a world that had been closed to women, more
recent feminist work has raised questions about the structure of that
world. Rather than simply being men in skirts, women have begun to
think that they can still be women in roles that were, in the past, the sole
province of men. As a consequence, definitions of the roles themselves
130. See James C. Walker, In a Diffident Voice" Cryptoseparatist Analysis of Female Moral
Development, 50 SOCIAL RESEARCH 665 (1983).
131. For a thoughtful exploration of many of the issues raised by Gilligan, see Joan C. Tronto,
Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND
SOCIETY 644 (1987).
132. See generally Lawrence A. Blum, Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, 98
ETHICS 472 (1988).
133. See Debra Nails, Social Scientific Sexism. Gilligan's Mismeasure of Man, 50 Soc. RnS. 643
(1983); B. Bradford Brown, Book Review, In a Different Voice, 9 SEx ROLES 756 (1983); John M.
Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's
Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. RES. 597 (1983); Catherine G. Greeno & Eleanor E. Mac-
coby, How Different is the "'Different Voice," in On In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary
Forum, 11 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 304, 310-316 (1986). Gilligan
responded to those comments in that Forum; see Reply by Carol Gilligan, 11 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF
WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 324 (1986).
134. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation; Isabel Marcus and Paul
J. Spiegelman, Moderators, Ellen C DuBois, Mary C Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Conversants, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 25-30 (1985); see also
Judy Auerbach, Linda Blum, Vicki Smith, and Christine Williams, Commentary on Gilligan's In a
Different Voice, I 1 FEMINIST STUD. 149, 155-160 (1985) (Gilligan provides no information on class,
race, religion or ethnicity and attributes all differences to gender; the "problem with her book.., is
that it lacks a politics altogether.").
135. See Mary Joe Frug, The Role of Difference Models in the Study of Women in the Law
(paper prepared for the Workshop of Women in Law: Assimilation or Innovation, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, August 3-5, 1987 (analysis of "assimilation", "acceptance", "rejection" and
"disruption" models created in response to the question of women and law) (on file with author).
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may change. While Gilligan and MacKinnon provide divergent explana-
tions both of the sources of what we understand today to be "women's
ways" and of how feminism will be transformative, Gilligan, MacKin-
non, and others ask how women's voices might be taken into account.
2. Robin West and the Differences of Gender
Carol Gilligan's claims of women's sense of relatedness are paral-
leled by Robin West's analysis of legal and political theory. West, from a
different intellectual and academic discipline, describes a world of "femi-
nist theory" based upon the premise of connection. According to West,
contemporary male moral and political philosophers adhere to what she
terms the "separation thesis" - that theorists assume, as a first premise,
that individuals are separate and cut off from one another. 136 In con-
trast, "women are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably,
always, and forever separate from other human beings ....137 West
points to the experiences of pregnancy, heterosexual intercourse, and
nursing as vivid moments of connection. But connection is not greeted
unambivalently, for these moments of connection can also be understood
as moments of intrusion. Because women are constantly in danger of
being invaded physically without even any semblance of consent, 3
women's experience is constantly one of potential connection and/or
invasion.
Strong currents run between Gilligan and West. When studying
development, Gilligan saw both girls and boys facing the same dilemma:
"[a] conflict between integrity and care" - resolved by young females
with an "ethic of care" and by males with an "ethic of rights." '139 Gilli-
gan, like West, understands the relationship of self to other as critical:
"[W]omen replace the bias of men toward separation with a representa-
tion of the interdependence of self and other....
But West has not simply taken Gilligan's insights and applied them
to jurisprudence. In addition to an enriching analysis of major trends in
political thought, West offers another theory about the sources of the
differences between women and men. While Gilligan's work is based
upon a mixture of the psychoanalytic and cultural experiences of women,
West's claim of difference is based upon enduring conditions of many
136. West, supra note 2, at 1, 4-12.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 15, 28-29, 34-36; see also DWORKIN, supra note 105.
139. GILLIGAN, supra note 2, at 160.
140. Id. at 170.
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women's lives: The physical experiences of being entered and of being
attached to other human beings. These gendered experiences would not
disappear if women and men were to share nurturing roles.
With her emphasis upon women's distinct physical experiences,
West could be characterized as a "radical," rather than a "cultural,"
feminist. As West describes the distinction between the two: "cultural
feminists" are those for whom "the important difference between men
and women is that women raise children and men don't," '141 while "radi-
cal feminists" are those for whom "the important difference between
men and women is that women get fucked and men fuck." '1 42 West
attempts to bridge (and refute) this "traditional characterization"143 of
the kinds of feminist theories with two claims. First, in her view, both
strands of feminism understand the central concerns of women's
powerlessness and women's lives as physically different from those of
men.144 As a consequence, for West, all feminism is based upon the
"connection thesis" - that "[w]omen are actually or potentially materi-
ally connected to other human life. Men aren't." 145 Second, West chal-
lenges the distinction between cultural and radical feminists as
overdrawn because, at an experiential level, all women live with the con-
tradiction of fearing and valuing intimacy and of decrying and rejoicing
in connection. 146 Thus, West argues that, whether acknowledged or not,
feminists are always both cultural and radical feminists, in that we are
drawn simultaneously to celebrate women's capacity for connection and
to search for separation as a protection against invasion. "The potential-
ity for physical connection with others that uniquely characterizes
women's lives has within it the seeds of both intimacy and invasion, and
therefore, women rightly value the former while we dread and fear the
latter...."147
West's efforts to acknowledge contradictory premises of feminist
theories while simultaneously linking those theories are both admirable
141. West, supra note 2, at 13.
142. Id. For parallel analyses of the different modes of feminism, see DONOVAN, supra note
102; and JAGGAR, supra note 7.
143. West, supra note 2, at 13.
144. Id.; see also Catharine Hantzis, Is Gender Justice a Completed Agenda?, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 690, 700 (1987) (reviewing LENZ AND MYERHOFF, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICA: How
WOMEN'S VALUES ARE CHANGING OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIVES) ("Powerlessness is the cen-
tral fact of female experience.").
145. West, supra note 2, at 14.
146. Id. at 53-61.
147. Id. at 53. West also explores the dualities in the points of views of men; she describes and
analyzes what she terms the "official" liberal story and the "unofficial" critical legal studies' account
of male jurisprudence.
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and appealing. Of course, questions remain. As she notes in her con-
cluding comments, men like women are physically connected to other
lives - in utero and if engaging in intercourse. And not all women bear
children, nurse, or have physically penetrating sex. 148 Intercourse is an
act of physical connection, but it is the social context that describes that
act as one of "penetration" rather than "engulfment."' 149 Physical con-
nections per se have insufficient explanatory power.
3. Sara Ruddick and Maternal Thinking
A central topic for Sara Ruddick is mothering, a conflictual status of
"power and powerlessness."' 150 The power stems from the utter depen-
dence of child on caretaker; for a child, "a mother is the primary, uncon-
trollable source of the world's goods."'' While mothers hold enormous,
lifegiving powers, mothers are also powerless - powerless to protect
their children from war, from social and economic violence, and from
disease.
The experience of women as mothers has, until recently, been a pri-
vate experience in the sense that women have been relegated to a position
outside that of societal decision-making. The fact that (at least some)
women may now participate in a larger arena provides Ruddick with a
question: "Do women, who now rightfully claim the instruments of pub-
lic power, have cultures, traditions, and inquiries which we should insist
upon bringing to the public world?"' 52 With some hesitation,15 3 Rud-
dick responds with the concept of "maternal thinking," developed from
"features of mothering experience which are invariant and nearly
unchangeable, and others which, though changeable, are nearly
universal."' 54
For Ruddick, all theory arises from social practice, and hence
maternal thinking must be understood in light of the social state of moth-
ering. "Children 'demand' that their lives be preserved and their growth
be fostered."' 55 Three requirements emerge: A mother must preserve
148. Id. at 70-72.
149. Conversations with Barbara Herman and Dennis Curtis.
150. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, supra note 6, at 343; see also Ruddick, Preservative Love,
supra note 6.
151. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, supra note 6, at 343.
152. Id. at 345.
153. Id. at 346. Ruddick notes, with concern, the "oppressive uses to which any identification
of the 'womanly' can be put.... Despite these doubts, I am increasingly convinced that there arc
female traditions and practices out of which a distinctive kind of thinking has developed." Id.
154. Id. at 346-47.
155. Id. at 348.
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the child, foster growth, and shape her child to be an acceptable adult.
Maternal competence is developed by the capacity to provide for and to
protect a child, but the very acts of providing and protecting may also
inhibit children's growth. Thus, "the interest in preservation, growth,
and acceptability of the child are frequently and unavoidably in
conflict.""5 6
Mothering exists constantly in a fragile milieu, in the "face of dan-
ger, disappointment, and unpredictability." 5 7 Fears for a child's well-
being may lead a mother to exercise "excessive control,"15 8 but mother-
ing also demands that mothers recognize such control as excessive, as a
"liability." Such recognition distinguishes mothering from many other
activities which acknowledge no limits to the desirability of control.
15 9
Mothering also forces one to confront the reality that demands and needs
change daily and, thus, that "attentive love" and "humility" are
required."6 For Ruddick, attentive love requires a parent "[t]o love a
child without seizing or using it, to see the child's reality with the patient,
loving eye of attention - such loving and attending might well describe
the separation of mother and child from the mother's point of view." 61
Maternal behavior likewise generates humility, which "implies a
profound sense of the limits of one's actions and of the unpredictability
of the consequences of one's work."162
Mothering thus emerges from a complex and constantly changing
interaction between mother and child. Mothering may provide a model
of acceptance of a position of power, coupled with humility derived from
a keen awareness of the limits of one's powers. Another aspect of moth-
ering, which makes it intriguing as a model of power, is that the relation-
ship of mother to child changes over time. While Ruddick does not
explore the question of the mother as child, an aged parent can become
the responsibility of the grown child, who must also respond with atten-
tive love and humility. If one experiences the full cycle of being
mothered and of mothering, one moves in and out of power.
Ruddick is not wedded to mothering as a condition dependent upon
gender. For her, "'maternal' is a social category," and there can be
156. Id. at 349.
157. Id. at 350-51.
158. Id. at 349-50.
159. Id. at 350.
160. Id. at 351, 358-59.
161. Id. at 358 (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 351.
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"mothers of both sexes," 163 but the essential experience of mothering
must not be lost in the translation. Moreover, the lesson of maternal
thinking is not simply how to care for children on an individual basis;
rather the primary goal is to "bring a transformed maternal thought into
the public realm, to make the preservation and growth of all children a
work of public conscience... [and to] join in articulating a theory of
justice shaped by and incorporating maternal thinking."
16'
This vision of transformation is somewhat problematic. Not all of
us are parents. If social practice is the basis of theory, and some of us
lack the social practice, it is difficult to understand how the theory can
emerge. However, if the critical social practice is not limited to mother-
ing (as defined by being the parent of a helpless child) but also encom-
passes caretaking (as defined by providing for a needy person for whom
one has a deeply-felt attachment), then more members of the society can
share the experiential predicates. For example, if Ruddick were to
develop her theory to include the experiences of mothering one's parents,
as described above, then more of us partake of the necessary social prac-
tice. Yet problems still remain. Children's "demands" may not be uni-
versal but rather artifacts of social context and point of view.
165
Moreover, not all mothers do well by their children. t 6 Further, it is not
obvious how one translates the intimate connections developed out of
caretaking into modes of expression and senses of relationship appropri-
ate to those who are not intimate, or how, given the enormous disparity
of power held by mothers and children, one uses mothering as a model
for relationships of reciprocity.
4. Rosemary Ruether and Feminist Theology
The problems faced by Jewish and Christian feminist theologians
are exceedingly difficult. As Gerta Lerner reminds us:
[Mionotheism conceptualized a universe created by a single force-
God's will. . . . God . . . covenanted and contracted only with
males .... Only males could mediate between God and humans....
God's blessing of man's seed which would be planted in the passive
receptacle of woman's womb symbolically defined gender relations
163. Id. at 346. "Although maternal thinking arises out of actual child-caring practices, biolog-
ical parenting is neither necessary nor sufficient." Id. at 346.
164. Id. at 361 (emphasis in original).
165. See Cass Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHIc. L. REV. 1129
(1986).
166. See GRIMSHAW, supra note 7, at 240-253 (analysis of Maternal Thinking).
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under patriarchy. And in the story of the Fall, woman and more spe-
cifically, female sexuality become the symbol of human weakness and
the source of evil.
16 7
That is the legacy that feminist theologians address: How to find a place
for women in a world in which God was male and women were not per-
mitted to be counted in the community of prayer. Yet feminist theolo-
gians have been in the forefront of articulating alternative visions, of
learning to speak in other voices.
168
Rosemary Ruether begins with the perception that:
Male monotheism has been so taken for granted in Judeo-Christian
culture that the peculiarity of imaging God solely through one gender
has not been recognized.... Male monotheism reinforces the social
hierarchy of patriarchal rule through its religious system.... A sym-
bolic hierarchy is set up: God-male-female.
169
Her response is to begin by retrieving "the older world of Gods and God-
desses"'170 and the "mixture of male and female imagery for God."' 171 In
Judaism, "Shekhinah," the sense of presence, of God's immanence, is
invoked each Sabbath,'7 2 while in Christianity, the "figure of the Holy
spirit picks up many of the Hebraic traditions of the female Sophia and
Hokmah (spirit).'
173
167. GERTA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 200-01 (1986).
168. In addition to RUETHER'S SEXISM AND GoD-TALK, discussed infra text accompanying
notes 169-178, see generally ELISABETH SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, IN MEMORY OF HER: A FEMINIST
THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CHRISTIAN ORIGINs (1983); WOMANSPIRrr RISING: A FEMI-
NIST READER IN RELIGION (Carol P. Christ & Judith Plaskow eds. 1979); PHYLLIS TRIBLE, GOD
AND THE RHETORIC OF SEXUALITY (1978); RELIGION AND SEXISM: IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE
JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN TRADITION (Rosemary Radford Ruether ed. 1974) [hereinafter R.
RUETHER, RELIGION AND SEXISM]; and MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A
PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1973).
169. RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 6, at 53.
170. Id. at 54; see also RAPHAEL PATAI, THE HEBREW GODDESS (1978); Rita M. Gross, Steps
Toward Feminine Imagery of Deity in Jewish Theology, in ON BEING A JEWISH FEMINIST 234
(Susannah Herschel ed. 1983).
171. RUETHER, SEXISM AND GoD-TALK, supra note 6, at 56.
172. PATAI, THE HEBREW GODDESS, supra note 170, at 99-118. According to Patai,
Shekhinah derives from the Hebrew verb "shakhan," meaning the "act of dwelling." When first
appearing, Shekhinah referred to "that aspect of the deity which can be apprehended by the senses."
Id. at 102-03. Subsequently, as the feminine identity of the Shekhina developed, the issue became
whether two aspects of one deity or two deities existed. Id. at 110-118. Patai concludes that "[f]rom
about 400 B.C. to 1100 A.D. the God of Judaism was a lone and lofty father-figure, and whatever
female divinity was allowed to exist in his shadow was either relegated to a lower plane, or her
femininity was masked and reduced to a grammatical gender...." Id. at 120. However, "contrary
to the generally held view, the religion of the Hebrews and the Jews was never without at least a hint
of the feminine in its God-concept." Id. at 258.
173. RUETHER, SEXISM AND GoD-TALK, supra note 6, at 59. Patai translates Hokhma as "wis-
dom," described, for example, in the Book of Proverbs as "God's playmate." PATAI, THE HEBREW
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But Ruether rejects
divine androgyny [as a solution, for in] such a concept, the feminine
side of God, as a secondary or mediating principle, would act in the
same subordinate and limited roles in which females are allowed to act
in the patriarchal social order. The feminine can be mediator or recipi-
ent of divine power .... [S]he can be God's daughter, the bride of the
(male) soul. But she can never represent divine transcendence in all
fullness .... We need to go beyond the idea of a "feminine side" of
God... and question the assumption that the highest symbol of divine
sovereignty still remains exclusively male.17
How does one get beyond that point? Ruether argues that Biblical
reinterpretation brings one to a God/ess who "is not the creator and
validator of the existing hierarchical social order, but rather the one who
liberates us from it, who opens up a new community of equals." '75 As a
consequence, "language about God/ess drawn from kingship and hierar-
chical power must lose its privileged place. Images of God/ess must
include female roles and experiences. Images of God/ess must be drawn
from the activities of... people at the bottom of society.... Adding an
image of God/ess as loving, nurturing mother, mediating the power of
the strong, sovereign father, is insufficient." '176 The God/ess is not only
transcendent, and all powerful but is also immanent, a presence inti-
mately connected with one's sense of oneself. 77
I do not know whether Ruether would directly challenge Sara Rud-
dick's views on maternal thinking, but Ruether does argue against a
parenting model for the divine. Ruddick focuses upon the experiences of
the mother and finds much there that is instructive for spheres of rela-
tionships beyond the parental. Ruether focuses upon the experiences of
the child and argues that identification of oneself as a child of God is
GODDESS, supra note 170, at 100-01, citing Proverbs 8:22-31. See also Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza,
Feminist Spirituality, Christian Identity, and Catholic Vision, 136, 138-40, in WOMANSPIRIT RISING,
supra note 168; and E.IORENZA, IN MEMORY OF HER, supra note 168, at 130-140.
174. IL REUTHER, SEXISM AND GoD-TALK, supra note 6, at 61; see also Judith Plaskow, The
Right Question is Theological in ON BEING A JEWISH FEMINIST, supra note 170, at 223, 227 ("The
God at the surface of Jewish consciousness is a God with a voice of thunder.... The female images
that exist in the Bible ... form an underground stream that reminds us of the inadequacy of our
imagery without, however, transforming its overwhelmingly male nature.").
175. K_ RUETHER, SEXISM AND GoD-TALK, supra note 6, at 69. For further discussion of
spirituality, with and without hierarchy, see the exchange between Gloria Z. Greenfield, Does Hier.
archy Have a Place in Women's Spirituality?, and Z. Budapest, The Vows, Wows, and Joys of the
High Priestess or What Do You People Do Anyway? in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S SPIRITUALITY
531-540 (Charlene Spretnak ed. 1982).
176. RUETHER, SEXISM and GOD-TALK, supra note 6, at 69.
177. Plaskow, supra note 174, at 246-47.
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harmful. "Patriarchal theology uses the parent image for God to pro-
long spiritual infantilism as virtue and to make autonomy and assertion
of free will a sin." 178 Rather, "[w]e need to start with language for the
Divine as redeemer, as liberator, as one who fosters full personhood, and,
in that context, speak of God/ess as creator, as source of being." '179
How can a God/ess be a "source of being" but not a parent?
Ruether challenges us to acknowledge that the ways we conceive of rela-
tionships are themselves products of patriarchal conceptions that are dif-
ficult to escape. Ruether refuses to accept that the current categories are
the only ones available. The lines between "nature and spirit," between
mind and body, between this world and the other, all are suspect.
18 0
"The God/ess who is the foundation (at one and the same time) of our
being and our new being embraces both the roots of the material substra-
tum of our existence (matter) and also the endlessly new creative poten-
tial (spirit).... We have no adequate name for the true God/ess, the 'I
am who I shall become'."' 81
5. The Basic Thesis of Connection
A first point is obvious. The language of the law of judges and the
language of feminism have virtually no convergences. My summaries of
feminist theories might not be sufficient to convey the expeience of sus-
tained reading in the area, but I hope that the summaries are adequate to
demonstrate both the feminist interdisciplinary continuities and the
absence of an overlap between feminist theories and the traditional aspi-
rations for our judges. A touchstone of feminism is connection; over and
over again, feminist theories speak about our interrelatedness, our inter-
dependencies, ourselves and others as impossible of comprehension in
isolation. 8 2 Even those addressing quintessential holders of power -
mothers and gods - speak of bower in light of connection. Sara Rud-
dick writes about attentive love and humility, the absence of control, and
the difficulties engendered by the concurrency of being powerful and
178. R. RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 6, at 69.
179. Id. at 70.
180. Id. See also Fran Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study in Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983) (bridging dualities in legal culture).
181. RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 6, at 70-71.
182. Let me add one caveat. I am not claiming that these insights are unique to feminism.
Other traditions demand understanding of individuals in the context of the communities of which
they are a part. For examples of analysis of legal materials that stress the humanity of litigants and
that criticize the depersonalization and decontextualization of much legal work, see Milner S. Ball,
Constitution, Court, Indian Tribe, 1987 AM. B. F. RES. J. 1; JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTnTY
(1978); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976).
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powerless. 18 3 Rosemary Ruether envisions a yet-to-be comprehended
state of power without oppression, of a God/ess without hierarchy.18
The case law and commentary on the role of the judge have none of
these qualities. Instead, one finds the fiat: "No man is permitted to try
cases where he has an interest in the outcome."18 5 Such a statement is
not accompanied by an acknowledgement that we are all interested, that
not all interests are equal nor equally bad, 8 6 and that the kind of interest
intended to be banned is a particular form of self-aggrandizement.
Rather, the traditional aspirations for judges assume a single kind of
undesirable interest, a connection linked to corruption. The terms of the
world of the judge - disinterest, disengagement, impartiality, indepen-
dence - are words that are deeply suspicious of relationship. As my
earlier discussion of the "law" of impartiality showed, 8 7 we do not really
require those qualities in their absolute terms, but we do continue to
speak as if we did. Thus one can see that the legal tradition for judges
may be impoverished by the absence of feminist insights.
At one level, what is missing is evident: We do not, but we could,
demand that those who hold power do so with attentive love, with care,
with nurturance, with a responsible sense of one's self as connected to
and dependent upon those who are being judged. Let me offer a personal
experience to underscore this point. I testified before the Senate Judici-
ary Committee that held hearings on the nomination of Robert Bork to
be an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. To prepare, I
read Judge Bork's opinions, articles, and speeches in the area of my
expertise, procedure. I was struck by how infrequently his commentary
and opinions discussed the facts of the cases, the people, the lives and the
pain of the litigants. My distress at the modes of analysis led me to criti-
cize the nominee on several grounds, including the failure to speak with
the requisite particularity and compassion. In my written statement, I
provided no citation for that requirement, for I had no learned legal
opinion upon which to rely.' 88 A modification of the official dogma of
183. See supra notes 150-164 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 167-181 and accompanying text.
185. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
186. For a moving exploration of how "interests" vary depending upon one's closeness and
distance to a profoundly disabled child, see Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family:
For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 933, 974-989 (1985).
187. See supra notes 29-89 and accompanying text.
188. Justice Brennan's Cardoza lecture was published after the Bork hearings. Justice Brennan
discussed the impact of "human stories" on the Supreme Court decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, was
published. Brennan, supra note 108, at 972. Also subsequent to the Bork hearings, Anthony Ken-
nedy, in a written response to a Senate Judiciary Committee questionnaire, identified the qualities of
1922
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judging would be required to add the traits of compassion, care, concern,
nurturance, identification, and sympathetic attention to the list of aspira-
tions for our judges. 189
But there are (at least) three difficulties. The first is one of domina-
tion. Assuming that we could alter the aspirations for judging,19 what
would happen if the list of judicial qualifications were simply enlarged by
adding the qualities feminist theories have helped us learn to value?
Here, we must heed Rosemary Ruether's warning to reject an androgy-
nous Judg/ess because, under conditions of patriarchy, the addition of
traits associated with the female only ratifies their second class status. In
addition to religious and literary traditions, visual imagery demonstrates
this problem. Ruether's point is illustrated in several paintings of the
Last Judgment. Jesus is portrayed as the judge, elevating some to heaven
and condemning others to hell. Mary is at his side, intervening to plead
for mercy.191 Ruether's point may also be echoed in legal doctrine about
the relationship between law and equity. Law is the starting place.
Equity is the cabined, secondary response - appended, ad hoe, supple-
mentary and suspect.192 Stirring a bit of connection and responsible nur-
turance in the pot of powerful disengagement of our judges is hardly the
kind of transformative response that feminist insights demand. A revised,
rather than an expanded, list of attributes, is required.
A second problem is one of enthusiasm. How sure can we be that
connection and care are qualities we want for our judges? Women's
a "good judge" as including "compassion, warmth, sensitivity and an unyielding insistence on jus-
tice." Nominee to Court Says Judges Should Avoid Making Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1987, atA26,
col. 1.
189. Significant changes would be required if some of the qualities were to be added. See, eg.,
California v. Brown, 107 S.Ct. 837, 840 (1987) (jury may be instructed, in death penalty, not to be
swayed by "mere sympathy").
190. Such an assumption might be heroic. See Id. at 837; see also Sosi Biricik, Matt Collette,
Mike Malloux, Antisympathy Instructions in Capital Sentencing Proceedings A Criticism of Califor-
nia v. Brown, (May 1988) (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
191. In some Italian communal buildings of the sixteenth century, images of Mary are accompa-
nied with the inscription, "Odi l'altra parte!" (Hear the other side!). Edgerton, supra note 27, at 52
n. 38. See also Dorothy C. Shorr, The Role of the Virgin in Giotto's Last Judgment, 38 ART BULL.
207 (1956); and Eleanor Commo McLaughlin, Equality of Souls, Inequality of Sexes- Women in
Medieval Theology, in REUTHER, RELIGION AND SExIsM, supra note 168, at 213, 247-51 (popular
literature also depicted Mary as "a mediator between the punishing God and the sinner needful of
mercy," which gives to her "a necessary and a praiseworthy role in the divine economy, but still it is
a woman's role: auxiliary, subordinate, marked by emotionalism, irrationality, sensuality, and ulti-
mately a lack of dignity."). See generally GRAEF, supra note 27.
192. But see Stephen Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987) (arguing that in the twentieth
century, equity has become the dominant mode, and provides judges with increased discretion).
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experience of connection and care have not been uniformly uplifting. As
Robin West so well summarizes, radical feminists remind us that with
connection can come debasement, the experience of intimacy as paraly-
sis, of interdependence as moments when one loses a sense of self,'93 all
accompanied by what Sara Ruddick describes as "cheery denial."'
194
Judges, like women, may well fear intimacy. Isolating judges by calls for
distance and disengagement and by fragmentation of responsibility
could, in one sense, have been understood as enabling. How, one might
ask, could an empathetic judge sentence another-in-whom-one-sees-one-
self to years of incarceration? How could judges impose economic bur-
dens on struggling individuals or entities? For those of us who might
applaud a possible reduction in criminal penalties which such intimacy
and empathy might foster, we must recognize that our empathic judges
would not simply experience connection with defendants, but also with
victims. Might such judges respond with too harsh condemnations? Or
with paralysis from being torn in many directions?
I think paralysis-by-connection to be no more likely than paralysis-
by-intellectualization. In our current world, in which we do not ask
judges to recognize their connectedness to those before them, some
judges impose harsh sentences and some more lenient ones; some judges
impose obligations upon litigants without much apparent stress while
others appear reluctant to sanction. The length of judicial opinions and
the energy of some dissents bear testimony to the tugs and pulls of con-
temporary judging, complete with its claims of dispassion and disinterest.
But then, one might ask if feminist revision is needed, and (not sur-
prisingly), my answer is yes. Recognition of the tugs, the pulls, and the
burdens of judging would be beneficial. A Nigerian sculpture of what
one art historian describes as a "lord of jurisprudence" is pierced by
many knives, reflecting (according to one interpretation) "a spirit so
strong he can wear upon his stalwart chest the painful, intricate issues of
his peoples symbolized by inserted blades."' 195 See Figure 2. Perhaps if
we learned to speak of judging as a terrible and terrifying job, as a burden
of inflicting pain by virtue of judgment, we might develop modes of reso-
lution different from those so readily accepted today. We might seek
more communal modes of decision-making, insisting upon groups of two,
three, or four judges to share the honor, the obligation, and the pain of
193. West, supra note 2, at 32-36; see also DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 63-79.
194. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, supra note 6, at 351.
195. Robert Farris Thompson, Kongo Power Figure, in PERSPECITVES: ANGLES ON AFRICAN
ART 180 (1987), and discussed in Roberta Smith, Multiple Viewpoints in African Sculptures, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1987, at C38, col. 3.
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Figure 2
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Anonymous, Kongo Nail Figure, circa 1875-1900. Reprinted with per-
mission of the Detroit Institute of Arts, Founders Society, Eleanor Clay
Ford Fund for African Art.
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decision. When we recognize the burden and the pain of judging, we
might uncover one element of adjudication that exists but is relatively
unacknowledged: Much "adjudication" is not a win/lose proposition but
an effort at accommodation, with judges and juries responding to both
sides but currently without vocabulary or permission to express empathy
with competing claims.1 96 Many verdicts allocate victory to both sides,
but our tradition is to mask that allocation rather than to endorse the
practice of seeing multiple claims of right. Feminism may help bolster
our trust in practice and permit us to remove the facades of total victory
and defeat.
A third problem with revising the list of aspirations for our judges is
one of meaning and application. Care, connection, nurturance, identifi-
cation are distinct qualities, each in need of contextual examination. 197 If
we simply stipulate to an expanded list of qualities for judges, we slip
back into the universalism that feminist vantage points have taught us to
suspect. Moreover, courts have claimed to be nurturant in the past; the
juvenile court and indeterminate sentencing were both based upon argu-
ments of an obligation to be responsive to the needs of the populations
presumably being served. Maternal thinking is appealing as a model, but
many accounts of juvenile court and indeterminate sentencing suggest
that parenting modes are profoundly disabling to those parented. t98
Where does "attentive love" come from in a society as heterogeneous as
ours? Communitarianism is a popular word in legal academe today, but
the word is used without much attention paid to the fact of a multitude
of extant communities, with competing modes of being. While commu-
nities may be (to borrow Robert Cover's phrase) "jurisgenerative,"
judges are often "jurispathic." 199 Many of us cheer when the "juris"
being killed is law that is sexist and racist.
196. Even when compromising, juries and judges must announce winners and losers, as deci-
sion-makers allocate wins and losses. For discussion of how remedies might develop differently see
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement, Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement
Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985).
197. See, eg., GR1MSHAW, supra note 7, at 215-226 (the meaning and politics of caring); Lynne
N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987) (an analysis of empathy).
198. See, e.g., ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERIMENT (1978). "Simply put, the lesson of the psychotherapeutic approach to delinquency
seemed to be that the juvenile court was fundamentally unsuited to the task of rehabilitation because
it was inescapably a court of law." Id. at 140. On sentencing, see Sanford Kadish's introduction to
Determinate Sentencing: Reform or Regression? IX (National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice, 1978) ("Individualization, rehabilitation, sentence indeterminacy all seem on their
way down, if not on their way out").
199. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
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One possible response is that this history cannot teach us much
about the future. The creation of juvenile courts and the imposition of
indeterminate sentences were not authentic exercises in nurture but were
ill-conceived, class-based impositions of self on others. While such a
description is at least partially true, it fails to answer the question of how
one can, with claims of connection and ethics of care and nurturance,
impose - by virtue of the power of the state - sanctions on people
adjudged to have acted illegally. One might then return to the argument
made in the introductory comments to this section: That exploration of
feminism and adjudication demonstrates that the two (like feminism and
monotheism2") may simply be incompatible. Both adjudication and
monotheism presuppose hierarchy, and a central tenet of some of femi-
nist theories is that hierarchy is the core of a patriarchal system.
At one level, the rejection of hierarchy, adjudication, and monothe-
ism has appeal. But I believe this approach is also incomplete. A first
problem is that each of these terms is being used at a level of generality
too sweeping to permit analysis. There are many forms of hierarchy, of
adjudication, and of monotheism. For example, some feminist groups
have developed modes of rotating decision-making, of routinely revising
authoritative and hierarchical relationships. Another part of my dissatis-
faction with such a rejection comes from the "other world" quality of the
claim. Those of us moved by feminist insights should not simply abdi-
cate responsibility for all current political processes nor fragment our
lives to avoid struggling with the tensions. We live here, in a world
steeped in diverse forms of hierarchy, adjudication, and monotheism.
Finally, I am suspicious of a response, in the name of feminism, that
declines to accept power, authority, and responsibility. Sara Ruddick is
instructive here; maternal thinking is predicated upon the practice of
adults caring for children. The fact of power, and an acceptance of the
obligation to exercise it, comes from the social practice of caretaking.
Because current social practice demands ongoing relationships between
mother and child, the power is tempered with compassion, the authority
with affection. Because the parenting exists in a context of a dangerous
world, the mother holds her power with the painful self-consciousness of
the limits of her powers.
200. See, eg., Emily Erwin Culpepper, Contemporary Goddess Theology: A Sympathetic Cri-
tique, in SHAPING NEW VISIONS: GENDER AND VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 65 (Clarissa W.
Atkinson, Constance H. Buchanan, & Margaret R. Miles eds. 1987) ("Starkly put, The One is basi-
cally a hostile term for feminists.").
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A great gulf lies between mothering and judging, but judging may
well have much to learn from maternal thinking. I think that there can
be feminist approaches to the act of judging and to the role of judge, and
that feminism can and must address the central problems of power and
constraint.20 1 How can we empower judges to understand their connec-
tions to and separation from those before them but simultaneously con-
strain judges who are, by and large, strangers employed by a state and
charged with the responsibility of exercising power over others? How, in
Richard Sennett's terms, might judges both "judge and reassure," exer-
cising a power that is "nurturing and restrained. 20 2 And, to borrow
from Pat Cain's wonderful words, "how can we tell the good bias from
the bad?"20 3
IV. A DESCENT FROM THE HEIGHTS
Feminist theories of judges must build from the practice of judging.
I cannot - should not - impose, top down, a set of prescriptions. I can,
instead, develop observations from the work of feminist judges, who can
lead the way to perceptions of alternative modes.
A. THE VoIcEs OF WOMEN
In addition to quoting comments by Malcolm Lucas, of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, I began this essay by quoting Shirley Abrahamson, a
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice, who has written a good deal about the
act of judging. "'What does my being a woman specially bring to the
bench?' It brings me and my special background. All my life experiences
- including being a woman - affect me and influence me. ...
Notice that her comments are "in a different voice," for, unlike the tradi-
tion of distance, Shirley Abrahamson accepts her history and rejoices
that her life informs her work. But, just as Carol Gilligan has been
accused of a selection bias, so can I be challenged. A few phrases out of
context. Those of one woman, compared to those of one man.
201. I join in Robin West's call for a "reconstructive jurisprudence," supra note 2, at 68. To
paraphrase Sandra Harding, our task is to answer the adjudication question in feminism - and not
simply to answer the feminist question in adjudication.
202. SENNETT, supra note 23, at 154, 197.
203. Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1945 (1988).
204. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE L.
REV. 489, 492-94 (1984) (remarks given on October 5, 1980 at a luncheon meeting at the Second
Annual Meeting of the National Association of Women Judges in Washington, D.C.).
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But listen to more from Justice Abrahamson. In an address to the
National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ), Abrahamson urged
judges to visit - essentially incognito - courtrdoms in other cities. She
described her experience in one courtroom, where she arrived, "dressed
in my t-shirt, wrap-around jean skirt, and sandals."2 "5 The clerk was
abrasive and "unfriendly," the lawyers condescending, the legal activity
taking place in chambers, outside the public purview.20 6 Justice Abra-
hamson's request that judges enter into the world of litigants and the
public was, in essence, a plea that judges attempt not only to understand
the perspective of another, but to be an other (when possible), to experi-
ence the meaning of being a person in a courtroom who lacks the first
name "Judge." 207 By going to the courtroom unrobed, and therefore
temporarily powerless, Shirley Abrahamson was able to understand more
clearly how much her position of power affects her own construction of
courtroom reality.
Justice Abrahamson also exhorted her sibling jurists to speak to the
public and to participate in community organizations. Contrast this view
with the Code of Judicial Conduct, which worries about extrajudicial
activities that will "detract from the dignity" of the judicial office.208
The judicial canons have been used as the basis for criticism of judges
who have participated in too many public activities.20 9 Felix Frankfurter
made statements about judicial distance from the fray, all the while
engaging in backroom politicking.210 Unlike Frankfurter, Shirley Abra-
hamson's views unify theory and practice and provide a very different
conception of the judicial role.
Listen also to Judge Patricia Wald, now Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Judge Wald joined
Justice Abrahamson and Deans John Ely and Jesse Choper on a panel
205. Id. at 497.
206. Id. at 497-98.
.. 207. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text for discussion of other ways in which judges
self-consciously -relinquish power.
208. The CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT provides that a judge may engage in what it terms
"avocational activities" if they "do not detract from the dignity of his office or interfere with the
performance of his judicial duties". CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (1984).
209. See generally LUBET, supra note 11.
210. See Felix Frankfurter, Personal Ambitions of Judges: Should a Judge "Think Beyond the
Judicial"?, 34 A.B.A. J. 656 (1948). Many male judges have engaged in a range of extrajudicial
activity, some of which is chronicled by Frankfurter. See also Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Com-
mentary by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-62: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 633 (1962) (discussing the views judges have held about speaking in public).
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entitled "Judicial Review and Constitutional Limitations." ' Judge
Wald commented on the academic vogue of considering the question of
judging in the context of constitutional jurisprudence. "I am not at all
sure that the debate among the judicial review jurisprudentialists is really
aimed at affecting the behavior of ordinary judges at all.... The point is
simple: constitutional cases for most federal judges are a rarity - gour-
met fare, definitely not the bread and butter of our everyday work-
lives." 2 '2 Her criticism was deeper than the problem of irrelevance.
Judge Wald argued that the academics failed to take into account the
experienced reality of judging:
[F]ew judges I know reach out for or even want to decide constitu-
tional issues. Such reticence does not stem from innate humility alone;
but from a weary recognition that anytime you reverse some govern-
mental action on constitutional grounds, it almost inevitably means en
banc review, or certiorari granted and probable reversal. The progno-
sis, 'of course, is quite different if you decide that challenged action is
constitutional. I suggest there is institutionally and experientially a
very strong built-in bias in the lower courts against holding laws or
actions violative of the federal constitution.21
In short, Judge Wald argued that the "big" academic questions - the
creation of new rights and the judicial usurpation of legislative and exec-
utive roles - are uninformed by, and irrelevant to, the reality of judging.
Judge Wald argued for an appreciation of the daily experiences of judg-
ing and for a jurisprudence of judging built upon the experience of
judges, rather than imposed from theory.
Compare Judge Wald's voice to that of Antonin Scalia, Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Like Judge Wald, Justice
Scalia has commented on the everyday work of judges. In a recent
speech, he deplored the drudgery of a federal judge, "processing many...
less significant cases," such as "many routine tort and employment dis-
putes."2 '4 Justice Scalia spoke of his understanding, in 1960, when he
graduated from law school, of the task of federal judges. "[W]hen I had
the unrealistic ambition of being a federal judge, back in 1960, I did not
211. 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 645 (1984). See also Patricia M. Wald, Disembodied Voices
-An Appellate Judge's Response, 66 TEx. L. REv. 623, 627 (1988); Patricia M. Wald, The Role of
Morality in Judging: A Woman Judge's Perspective, 4 LAW & INEQUALrrY 3 (1986).
212. 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 649-50.
213. Id. at 650.
214. Antonin Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the
National Conference of Bar Presidents, 3, 5 (Feb. 15, 1987) (on file with the author).
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want to dispose of predominantly routine cases. .. ."215 Justice Scalia
suggested that "trivial cases" - explicitly defined as many social security
claims and implicitly defined as those of little dollar value - be removed
from the federal courts.2" 6 Note that the commentary of Judge Wald and
Justice Scalia have a similar basis - the experience of being a judge.
Both Wald and Scalia remark on the distance between the reality of
judges and the rhetoric of judging. Judge Wald seeks to have the reality
inform the rhetoric, while Justice Scalia wants to change the reality to
conform to his view of what judges "should" do; important men do not
engage in routine tasks.
In addition to individual voices, there is a bit of information about
how women judges speak in the aggregate. The National Association of
Women Judges (NAWJ) provides some data. "As a large national organi-
zation, we can speak out on those issues - often controversial ones such
as discriminatory clubs or federal judicial appointments - that individ-
ual judges, with all their ethical restrictions, do not feel they can appro-
priately address. 21 7 The NAWJ addressed the issue of discriminatory
clubs because of a perceived link between behavior in the world at large
and the task of judging; the NAWJ opposes membership by judges in
clubs that practice invidious discrimination.2 18 The NAWJ argues for an
appreciation of the connection between what a judge does "on the bench
from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. [supposedly] making decisions without
regard to race or sex" and what the judge does at lunch "at a social club
which excludes women and blacks from its dining room."2 19
I do not want to overstate the distance between female judges and
the National Association of Women Judges, on the one hand, and male
judges and the canons of judicial ethics, on the other. Like the NAWJ,
the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct acknowledges
that a relationship exists between the person on the bench and the person
off the bench. The Code is replete with prohibitions on certain kinds of
"extrajudicial activities" and with acknowledgements that, while a judge
215. Id. at 7(emphasis in original). Cor~are the statistical analysis offered by Professor Marc
Galanter, in The Life and Times of the Big Six; or The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 5-
6, (paper prepared for the Symposium on the Role of the Federal Courts, NYU Law School, Nov.
14-15, 1987) (tort cases, recalled by Justice Scalia to be exceptional in 1960, were "the predominant
category in 1960-38.4% of all filings") (on file with the author).
216. See Scalia, supra note 214, at 3-8.
217. Judge Gladys Kessler, 1982-83 President of the NAWJ, writing in the Foreword to the
Symposium Issue: National Association of Women Judges, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 473, 479
(1984).
218. Id. at 478.
219. Id.
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can engage in civic activities, a judge must not do so in a manner that
"detracts from the dignity" of the judicial office. 220 Moreover, the Amer-
ican Bar Association recently adopted a change in the commentary to the
Code to recognize that membership in discriminatory clubs was problem-
atic.221 However, unlike the National Association of Women Judges, the
ABA was unwilling to add commentary insisting that individuals with-
draw from such institutions.222 And, unlike Justice Shirley Abrahamson,
the Code does not embrace the obligations of judges to leave their pro-
tected role and attempt to experience the judicial system as do those
without robes.
I also do not want to leave the impression that the few female voices
on the bench all exemplify what could be seen as the "upside" of femi-
nism. Another bit of collective information, provided by a statistical
analysis of decisions made by federal judges, reminds us that some tradi-
tions of women - subservience and deference to a patriarchal culture -
may also come with women to the bench. Thomas Walker and Deborah
Barrow wanted to learn whether black and female federal judges
appointed by the Carter administration decided cases differently from
their white, male colleagues.223 Using a "pairing" device, the researchers
220. Canons 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT address extrajudicial activity.
The canons recognize roles for judges off the bench. For example, the commentary to Canon 5
(requiring judges to regulate extrajudicial activities) notes that "complete separation" of a judge is
unwise because a judge "should not become isolated from the society in which he lives." See also
American Bar Association, Subcommittee on Unjust Criticism of the Bench, Unjust Criticism of
Judges at 1 (1986) ("undesirable for a judge to answer criticism" directly in the media.).
221. In 1984, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates voted to amend the commen-
tary to Canon 2 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, which provides that judges "should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety". The commentary states that it is "inappropriate"
for judges to belong to discriminatory clubs but leaves the decision about membership to individuals.
According to LUBET, supra note 11, at 42, a proposal to bar membership in such clubs was "soundly
defeated" by the House of Delegates.
The Judicial Conference of the United States also concluded that membership in clubs that
practice "invidious discrimination" was "inappropriate," but that the "conscience of the individual
judge" must determine "whether membership in a particular organization is incompatible with the
duties of judicial office." Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1981
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES at 27. See
generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Private Clubs and Public Judge" A Nonsubstantive Debate About
Symbols, 59 TEx. L. REV. 733 (1981) (criticizing the Judicial Conference's recommendation because
it evaded the central issue of what constitutes a discriminatory club and declined to bar participation
in institutional discrimination).
222. Compare the NAWJ's position, which would "prohibit judges from belonging to discrimi-
natory clubs." Forward, Symposium Issue7 National Association of Women Judges, 14 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 473, 478.
223. See Thomas B. Walker and Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985). For other studies evaluating male and
female judges see John Gruhl, Cassia Spohn, and Susan Welch, Women as Policymakers: The Case
1932
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compared opinions of twelve female/male pairs and ten black/white
pairs.22 a One of the study's findings was that "female judges were...
more prone to rule in favor of the government in federal regulatory dis-
putes.... Female judges exhibit a much greater tendency to defer to
positions taken by government than do male judges."2
How are we to interpret this information? Putting aside possible
methodological complaints such as sample size, a first problem is that the
researchers' analysis assumed that appropriate behavior was displayed by
the male judges. Women were compared to men, and women were found
wanting - found to be more deferential than were men. Perhaps the
women's behavior was appropriate and the male judges were simply dis-
playing male arrogance and a lack of humility.226 Alternatively, if the
women were, in Sara Ruddick's terms, engaging in a learned but undesir-
able behavior, obedience to the "actual control and preferences of domi-
nant people, '227 then how do we explain the women judges who rise
above such obedience? The real difficulty is thinking about how, over
time, a person could hold the position of judge, retain humility and yet be
able, when necessary, to challenge the powers of government. Responses
to this problem must come in part from learning how judges experience
their power and whether those experiences of power change over time.
Learning from the practice of judging will teach us lessons about our-
selves, as well as lessons about how we might transform our understand-
ing of judging.
B. THE REALITIES OF THE RULES REVISITED
In an earlier section of this paper, I provided four examples of the
tensions between the theory of disengagement and the practices of
judges. I return, briefly, to each of these problems to see whether femi-
nist insights might provide some clarity. Note that I did not pick the
four examples because feminism could "solve" the problems exposed; as
I discuss below, feminist insights have helped me articulate criticism of
some aspects of disqualification law but not others. I also am not
of Trial Judges, 25 AM. I. POL. Sm. 308, 314 (1981) (while finding "some differences in the convict-
ing and sentencing behavior of male and female judges, these differences are not large .. "); Her-
bert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in
Criminal Case Dispositions, 14 Soc. Sci. J. 77, 86 (April 1977) (female and male judges behave "no
differently").
224. Walker & Barrow, supra note 223, at 602.
225. Id. at 608.
226. See Catharine W. Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law
School Teaching, 38 . LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1988).
227. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, supra note 6, at 355.
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attempting an exhaustive feminist reinterpretation of the law of disquali-
fication. Rather, I want to explore what kinds of insights might emerge
from a dialogue between feminism and the law of judges.
My first example was the federal practice of requiring litigants to
bring disqualification motions to the judges who are being asked to
recuse themselves. This practice becomes incoherent when we simulta-
neously ask judges to decide about themselves as judges and claim that
they are disengaged and disinterested. When one's own capacity to judge
fairly is in question, it is difficult to believe one has no "interest." To the
extent that feminism can free us from false claims of disengagement, the
tension between rhetoric and practice might lessen.228 That is, once we
acknowledge that there is no state of absolute disinterest, we need not
deny the reliance upon interested individuals to make judgments about
their capacity to judge.
But liberation from "cheery denial" is short of endorsement of the
practice. Surely, in the name of feminism, I would not want to embrace
the view that because we are all "interested" at some level, no kinds of
interest are disqualifying.229 Many disqualification motions are aimed at
the person of the judge, at his or her relations to others, and the impact
of those relations upon the litigants.230 Unlike a feminist aspiration that
a judge be "interested" in the sense of identifying some aspects of the self
in others, in a motion for disqualification the judge is asked to rule upon
the self as if the judge could be an other.231
Why should we tolerate such a practice? Feminist insights may
again help to read the social context. One of the stated rationales for
having the challenged judge adjudicate his or her capacity to act fairly is
to protect the dignity of the judge from the challenge itself and from
228. Once again, these insights are not the exclusive domain of feminism. When litigants sought
to disqualify a black jurist, Judge Leon Higginbotham, from a case involving racial discrimination,
he eloquently reminded us that we all have races. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng's, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
229. See Cain, supra note 203.
230. For two cases in which allegations of friendship with litigants or with their attorneys were
the bases of disqualification motions and both judges held that friendship itself was not disqualifying,
see United States v. Meyerson, 677 F.Supp 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Judge Duffy stated he did not
have impermissible ties to Hortense Gabel, but recused himself voluntarily); and Liberty Lobby, Inc.
v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., No. 86-7017 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 7, 1987) (order and memorandum denying
motion for disqualification; Judge Bork declined to recuse himself in light of his relationship with
Suzanne Garment). Subsequently Judge Bork wrote the opinion on the merits affirming the trial
court. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
231. Judicial over-involvement is one element of the Supreme Court's ruling that requires the
judge who witnessed (and often, was the brunt of) the contemptuous conduct to recuse him or
herself in a subsequent criminal contempt trial. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
1934
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having to explain him or herself to other judges. In other words, self-
evaluation saves a judge from having to testify before another judge
about the grounds for disqualification. Why has the tradition of judging
seen a judge on the witness stand as somewhat "unseemly" and created
practices to avoid such an event? The judge as a "mere" witness or as a
partisan is reduced to being one of us, a supplicant before another indi-
vidual who has assumed the mantle of power.232
Rather than bemoan such a switch in roles, feminism teaches us to
celebrate such rearrangements, to require judges to let others judge them.
Such moments might better enable judges to be empathic, to adopt the
perspective of an other, to enter into the experience of the courtroom
unprotected by their special status. Judge as witness can thus be under-
stood as a profound challenge to a stable hierarchy, as a subversive act to
be applauded. Informed by feminism, I can better articulate why judges
should not hear challenges to their own capacities to judge. I want my
judges to have the experience of explanation before another who holds
power. I want litigants to see judges unrobed as well as robed. I want
the dialogic experience to inform us about what qualities lead us to fear
unfair judgment.233
My second example of the odd state of disqualification law was the
"Rule of Necessity," which leads judges to adjudicate matters in which
their personal stake is obvious. Once again, feminism would revise the
rhetoric. The Rule of Necessity is spoken of as the extraordinary excep-
tion to the ordinary state of disinterest. Feminism helps us see that the
ordinary state is always one of interest. The issue is thus sharpened:
What kinds of involvement make judging impermissible and demand the
creation of alternatives to those currently empowered as judges? Once
again, feminism also lays bare the protective hierarchical nature of the
232. Another part of the answer may lie in the history of federal disqualification practices (or
lack thereof), which developed during an era when it was truly difficult to have replacements. Fed-
eral judges were few, and distances great. See, eg., the comments of William S. Bennett, of the
House of Representatives, during debates on revision of a former version of the disqualification
statute (physical difficulties in getting another federal judge cause delays and make disqualification
undesirable). 46 CONG. REC. 2606, 2627-2629 (1911).
233. As John Leubsdorfnotes, the current custom is for judges to provide no explanation when
they voluntarily recuse themselves - insulating themselves from the obligation of interaction and
limiting information about judicial views on when recusal is appropriate. All the disqualification
cases emerge from litigant requests for recusal that are denied. Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 244-45.
See also Tony Mauro, How the Reporters got the Dope, Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 16, 1987 at
15, col. 2 (reporter attempted to see a recusal motion filed at the Supreme Court and was told that
such a motion "was not part of the public record .... The bottom line then, is that under Court
practice the existence of a recusal motion.., is unknowable by the public, unless a lawyer happens
to mention it.").
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current rules of judging. The Rule of Necessity shields judges from fac-
ing moments when their claim to authority should yield, when others
should be empowered to act. Feminist theory also helps reveal how the
Rule of Necessity functions to protect judges in their status as "Other."
By definition, all Rule of Necessity cases are those in which judges have
stakes. By inventing the Necessity, the patriarchal judiciary has saved
itself from appearing as litigant/supplicant before others. At the same
time, the Rule of Necessity promotes the myth that, unlike the rest of us,
judges can somehow rise above plebeian self-interest. With a clearer
sense of the harm of employing the Rule of Necessity, we can have the
energy to search for alternatives. At least seven states, relying upon con-
stitutional or statutory provisions, have employed ad hoc courts in situa-
tions when other jurisdictions would have invoked the Rule of
Necessity.234 These are the stories of judging that we must reclaim and
234. See Texas Code § 22.005, discussed supra at note 56. See also constitutional provisions:
Ark. Const. art. 7, § 9 (when all or any of the judges are disqualified the Governor appoints "the
requisite number of men learned in the law.. ."), relied upon in Ferrill v. Keel, 105 Ark. 380, 151
S.W. 269 (1912) (validity of legislative enactment), and in Brickhouse v. Hill, 167 Ark. 513, 268
S.W. 865, 869 (1925) (judicial salaries); N.D. Const. art. 6 sect. 3 (disqualified judges replaced by
appointment of the chief justice), relied upon in State ex reL Linde v Robinson, 35 N.D. 410, 160
N.W. 512 (1916) (timing of assumption of elected judicial office); Tenn. Const art. 6 § 11 (if "all or
any of the Judges of the Supreme Court... [are] disqualified ... the Governor... shall...
commission the requisite number of men, of law knowledge .... "), relied upon in State ex reL
Inman v. Brock, 622 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn. 1981) (defendant justices accused of illegally holding
office), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 941 (1981); Wash. Const. Amend. 38 art. IV § 2(a) (supreme court to
authorize judges or retired judges as judges pro tempore), relied upon in Yelle v. Kramer, 83 Wash.
2d 464, 520 P.2d 927, 928 (1974) (judicial salaries; court drew names for replacement judges out of
envelope).
Statutes: Ala. Code § 12-2-14 (1986) (Governor appoints members of the bar of the Supreme
Court to preside if court falls below six members, all are disqualified or court splits), relied upon in
Exparte Alabama Power Co., 280 Ala. 586, 196 So. 2d 702 (1967) (justice was a party to the case);
Tex. Govt't. Code Ann. § 22.005 (Vernon pamphlet 1988) (Governor to appoint "persons" with
supreme court justice qualifications if five or more justices are disqualified or court splits), relied
upon in Johnson v. Darr 272 S.W. 1098, 114 Tex. 516 (1925) (panel of women appointed); Va. Code
Ann. § 17-7(2) (1982) (chief justice designates a judge to preside if all the judges of any court of
record are disqualified), relied upon in Blue v. Virginia State Bar ex rel First District Committee,
222 Va. 357, 282 S.E.2d 6 (1981) (disciplinary proceedings against local attorney; panel of substitute
judges appointed).
Similarly, other states have relied upon special appointments of one or a few judges either to fill
the seats of disqualified judges or to break ties when a court, operating at less than its full member-
ship, splits. See, eg., Minn. Const. art. 6 § 2 and Minn. Stats. Ann. § 2.724 sub.2 (West Supp. 1988)
(supreme court may temporarily assign a retired justice or district court judge), relied upon in Peter-
son v. Knutson, 305 Minn. 53, 233 N.W.2d 716 (1975) (six of nine justices specially appointed);
Miss. Const. art. 6 § 165 (governor to appoint "others of law knowledge"), relied upon in DeMoe v.
McLeod, 228 Miss. 481, 89 So.2d 730, 731 (1956) (constitution intrepreted to allow Governor to
appoint a lawyer to preside with power to sign orders); Utah Const. art. VIII § 2 (remaining justices
shall call another judge to sit to constitute a quorum), relied upon in Critchlow v. Monson, 102 Utah
378, 131 P.2d 794 (1942) (justice's induction into military service constituted disqualification under
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retell. 235
My third example was the relationship between timing and chal-
lenges to the legitimacy of judgment; post-verdict attacks on the judg-
ments rendered by allegedly incompetent judges and jurors are frowned
upon. Feminism might not offer much help in weighing the tradeoffs
between closure and revisionism, but feminism might remind us of the
need for contextualization of rules of closure and revisionism. Not all
judgments have the same effects, and we might want to be more self-
conscious about reconsidering the legitimacy of judgments when their
effects are the most harsh. Such a view was exemplified by the Warren
Court, which developed a jurisprudence of habeas corpus that was sym-
pathetic to revisionism. 23 6 Thus, while it must be noted that feminism is
not an essential prerequisite to a sensitivity about the demands for recon-
sideration, feminist approaches might be a useful antidote in an era when
pressures for closure are mounting.
art. VIII § 2, and not a vacancy to be filled by appointment or election; mechanism existed for tie-
breaking if needed.); Florida Rules of Judicial Admin. 2.030(a)4(A) (permits chief justice to assign
any judge who is "qualified to serve"), relied upon in Board of County Commissioners of Bradford
Co. v. Judicial Space in the Bradford County Courthouse, 378 So.2d 1247, 1248-49 (1979 FI.App.)
(circuit judge assigned to case challenging the court's use of space).
Yet other states have constitutional or statutory provisions that one could, if one wanted to,
interpret as authorizing the appointment of substitute judges. See, eg., Del. Const. art. 4 § 15 (gover-
nor appoints judges ad ]item), relied upon in Nellius v. Stiftel, 402 A.2d 359 (1978) (court used Rule
of Necessity when governor refused to act on the court's request to appoint other judges); S.D.
Const. art. V § 11 (chiefjustice to authorize any judge or retired judge to sit on another circuit court
or on the supreme court); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 1103 (West Supp. 1987) (chief justice of
superior court or chief justice of supreme court to appoint temporary replacements).
Note that, like the federal system, many states rely on the Rule of Necessity. See, eg., Schwab v.
Ariyoshi, 57 Haw. 348, 555 P.2d 1329 (1976) (judicial salaries); Gordy v. Dennis, 176 Md. 106, 5
A.2d 69 (1939) (judicial salaries); Wagoner v. Gainer, 167 W. Va. 139, 279 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1981)
(salaries for retired justices); Commonwealth v. Loretta, 386 Mass. 794, 438 N.E.2d 56 (1982) (recall
of retired judges); In Re Ronwin, 139 Ariz. 576, 680 P.2d 107, 117 (1983) (defendant judges ruling
on petitioner's suit for admission to state bar); Reilly v. U.S., 538 A.2d 155 (R.I. 1988) (in light of
split decision, judge who recused himself recalled to sit and case assigned for reargnment); Olson v.
Cory, 27 Cal. 3d 532, 609 P.2d 991, 164 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1980) (judicial salaries). See alo Mosk v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles, 25 Cal.3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979) (court
disqualified en banc, chief justice used Rule of Necessity as applied to administrative officiers to
appoint a new court to hear the merits).
235. Tales of judicial innovation are actually hard to find; many courts do not have a tradition
of documenting their disqualifications, their special appointments, and their designations. No single
computer search discovered all of the cases cited supra notes 56 and 234. Sometimes, particularly in
an official reporter, a footnote explains why a special court was needed. Often, however, the text will
identify individual judges as special or pro tempore judges, but will neither note the orignal judges'
reasons for recusal nor describe how the replacement judges were selected.
236. See, eg., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Resnik, Tiers, supra note 64, at 874-92.
HeinOnline -- 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1937 1987-1988
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1877
A final example was the legal line drawing between "internal" and
"external" sources of prejudice. I do not think one needs feminism to
make plain that the line drawing is incoherent. Drugged and drunken
jurors are incompetent to judge, no matter who attests to their states of
intoxication. My criticism of Justice O'Connor's reticence to entertain
the challenge in the Tanner case237 is not based upon feminist insight.
Feminist theory does support my objection to one of the rationales
offered in Tanner - that of maintaining public confidence by precluding
attacks on jury verdicts.238 Implicit in the "public confidence" rationale
is the need for the myth of the judge as Other. Feminism helps us accept
the judge as one of us. Maternal thinking reminds us that it is essential
to experience power and powerlessness. Jurors, like the rest of us, may
err. Once we free ourselves from the pretense of judicial infallibility, we
can gain comfort in the capacity of human beings to structure means by
which to reconsider and to change outcomes in light of claims of error.
In addition, feminist theory makes me increasingly uncomfortable
with the law's willingness to permit judges to be repeat adjudicators
while denying that role to jurors. Given feminist suspicions about rules
that reinforce hierarchy, treating jurors and judges differently is cause for
concern. The practice of prohibiting jurors to sit on the same or related
cases demonstrates unease with individuals' capacity to see anew that
which they have already decided. Given that concern, the practice of
returning a case, on remand after reversal, to the very judge who ren-
dered the initial verdict can be understood not only as a technique to
conserve resources but also as a vehicle to preserve judicial power.
Remand to the judge provides insulation and is an act of deference. An
appellate court will rarely subject a judge to the kind of intensive review
that might occur if, upon remand, a case file were transferred to another
trial judge, who would then have to confront, and perhaps disagree with,
the decisions of the first trial judge.239
In short, feminist insight enables understanding of an agenda of the
rules of disqualification not often addressed; the rules protect the office of
237. Tanner v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (1987), discussed supra notes 65-75.
238. Id. at 2747-48.
239. The battles between Judge Manuel L. Real, Chief Judge of the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, and the Ninth Circuit are illustrative. In an unusual move, the
Court of Appeals refused to remand a case to Judge Real and ordered that a substitute judge be
selected at random. Judge Real objected and argued - via an unsuccessful mandamus petition -
that he had a "right" to keep the case. See David Savage & Kim Murphy, U.S. Judge Real Loses
Appeal in Yagman Case, L. A. Times, Dec. 1, 1987, Part 2, p. 1, col. 4.
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the judge in an effort to maintain the judge's hierarchically superior posi-
tion. Once understood in this light, we can confront the desirability of
the practices. Does a stable, unchanging position of hierarchy enable
better judgment? This is a serious and difficult question, not often openly
addressed by the law of judges. One possible response is that the such a
hierarchy is protective in an enabling manner.
Let me explore this possibility in the context of Rose Bird's exper-
iences as Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. As other articles
in this symposium reflect, there are many histories to be written about
what factors contributed to the upheaval on the California Supreme
Court in 1986. 41 In my view, one element in the flood of criticism of the
California Court and particularly of Chief Justice Bird is that she was a
woman playing in what had previously been an all male game. Bird was
the first woman to hold such a powerful job in the California judiciary.
Her femaleness left her extremely vulnerable, for she was not a prototypi-
cal "Other." Because Rose Bird did not fit the stereotype of the most
powerful justice in a court system, she could not rely upon the protection
of the role to buffer her from criticism.24' Bird's inability to hide in the
role of judge242 was responsible, in part, for her being fired, and the vul-
nerability that she engendered harmed her colleagues, Joseph Grodin
and Cruz Reynoso, who also lost their jobs. Extrapolating from Rose
Bird's experience, it is plausible that, were our judges continually to
reveal themselves as humans (females, the ordinary) and not "Others"
(males, the sacred), their special, privileged place would likewise be
diminished. Without their stable hierarchy, would judges still be able to
"speak truth to power"?2 4 3
Perhaps we can develop other mechanisms of protection, perhaps
we can reconceive hierarchies, perhaps one need not choose between
240. See Robert Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: 4 Retrospective
on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007 (1988); Joseph Grodin, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1988).
241. Catharine Hantzis, supra note 226, makes the parallel point about women who teach law.
242. The word "judge" has some power. In the June 1988 election in Los Angeles:
Regardless of ratings by the Los Angeles County Bar Assn., newspaper endorsements
or expensive slate mailings, only one trend ran true through the county judicial contests
Tuesday: Every candidate whose occupational designation on the ballot mentioned
"judge" won his or her election.
Indeed the only judge to be defeated, the Superior Court's Roberta Ralph, who lost to
attorney Harvey A. Schneider, had made the mistake of listing herself merely as 'incum-
bent' rather than "Judge of the Superior Court" as the other Superior Court judges had
done.
Kenneth Reich, 'Judge' Was the Winning Word on Ballots, L.A. Times, June 9, 1988, Part 2, at 1,
col. 2.
243. Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 13.
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hierarchy and diminution of power. Is Shirley Abrahamson less
powerfully a justice in her courtroom because she appears in another
courtroom without her judicial robes? With maternal thinking to help
us, we can understand that human beings may simultaneously be all
powerful and yet powerless. And rather than rush from that insight and
seek to deny the seeming contradiction, we might embrace that aspect of
the human condition. Relief may come from the understanding that in
fact we do not have total control.
C. FROM FEMINISM TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION?
Another way in which feminism can inform the role of judge is to
raise questions about the current modes of judging. Today, many chal-
lenge adjudication as inadequate and have argued for alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). Some commentators, and most eloquently Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, have argued that feminism is one of the strands that
supports a movement towards ADR.2 4
I must address the particularities of my own "interested" position
about this issue at the outset. I have written, critically, about the devel-
opment of managerial judges and the use of ADR. My concerns have
focused upon fears that alternative procedures do not provide much by
way of constraint. Judges acting as managers and judges acting as
mediators have substantial power but little visibility and few rules to
guide them. While far from perfect, adjudication is a form with some
boundaries.245 I have also argued that many modes of alternative dispute
resolution represent efforts at privatization of public conflicts and are,
like managerial judging, unbounded and unaccountable.246 Further, I
believe that the interaction, over time, between the adjudicatory process
and the public assists in the development of norms about both the merits
of disputes and about how disputes should be handled. As I noted in the
introductory pages of this essay, my writings have relied upon the tradi-
tional statements of our aspirations for judges.247
244. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 110, at 50-55; Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754 (1984). On ADR see generally, CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOL-
OGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985).
245. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 10, at 376; Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
246. Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, in Conference on Procedural Due Process: Lib-
erty and Justice, 39 FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987) (republished by the Institute for Civil Justice, Rand
Corp. (March, 1988)).
247. See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 10, at 376.
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Given my previously stated views, I have three choices. I could
retract what I have said in some of my other essays, on the grounds that
feminism has helped me see the light and understand that managerial
judges are simply trying to build "networks of care." Not surprisingly, I
decline to take that route because feminism has not assuaged my concern
that judges - albeit often well meaning - are ill-equipped and poorly-
situated to shape the lawsuits that they must decide. Were I to write
today, I might choose different modes of explication, but my fears of
judicial overreaching would remain. While I find calls for a "judiciary of
nurturance" appealing, I remain unconvinced that judges in this society
have much capacity, currently, to be nurturant. The United States pro-
vides shockingly little by way of care for families, for children, for the
needy. I am not confident that courts, the arenas of conflict, can be the
vehicle of transformation to a culture of nurturance without structural
changes in other aspects of our governance. At least until we commit
ourselves to social services that evidence concerns for the needs of the
powerless, I want judges who speak before the public, who make their
rulings in disputes revealed to the public, and whose interactions with
litigants are bounded.
A second alternative is for me to reiterate some of my criticisms in
the language of feminism. Hence, objections to managerial judging can
be based upon claims that managerial judging is an effort by already
powerful judges to expand the arena in which they exercise power over
others. In addition to judging, managerial judges direct the behavior of
litigants in less visible - and virtually unchallengeable - ways. Mana-
gerial judges may describe their role as engaging in dialogue with liti-
gants and as developing more flexible modes of interaction. However, in
practice the judges are the ones with power, their time is limited, and
they impose their views without authentic inquiry into the needs of those
before them. Managerial judges do not diminish patriarchal hierarchy;
they simply expand opportunities for control.
Let me turn to the third option and ask forthrightly: Does feminism
demand alteration of the act of judging itself? Imposition of one's truth
upon another, coercion, insistence upon compliance - these are
hallmarks of adjudication, as currently understood. It is tempting to
turn to other modes and claim them as more feminist, and hence to be
preferred by feminists. Mediation, for example, seeks to lead the partici-
pants to create their own outcomes.248 Why not place our energies
248. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305
(1971). According to one study, women mediators approach their roles differently than male
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behind efforts to escape adjudication and espouse other methods - those
aimed at settling, arbitrating, conciliating - so that we can meet our
alleged adversaries and find our commonality?
Several responses are possible. First, I cannot share the assumption,
implicit in some forms of ADR, that all outcomes are equally good, as
long as the parties agree to them. This essay is not the occasion for an
exposition of the problems with interest validation and/or consent, but
many political and moral theorists have pointed to the enormous difficul-
ties in assuming either as sufficient. 49 Second, in this world we meet our
adversaries not as equals, but often as unequals. In this world, the
mediators, the arbitrators, the conciliators come with the values of the
society. Earlier, I discussed the emerging documentation of institutional
sexism, racism, and class biases in the courthouse. For me, the time
when we expose the institutional weaknesses of our courts is not the time
to abandon courts in preference for other institutions whose sexism and
racism may not yet be known. We must try to define feminist modes of
adjudication before we conclude that adjudication must be abandoned.
Further, the pressures for alternatives come not only from those
who seek to humanize adjudication but also from those who want to
escape from the victories that the poor and disenfranchised have won in
courts. So soon after claims of right on behalf of the formerly silent have
begun to be heard in courts, interest in restricting access is strong. Many
examples of court closings are available; of particular concern to me are
proposals to abolish appeal as of right. In 1891, Congress created an
appeal as of right in the federal courts.2z 0 Today, some are urging that
we abandon the premise that every litigant has a right to be heard by
more than one judge.2 1l Feminism helps illuminate the weaknesses of
this proposal. How patriarchal, how lacking in humility, to think that a
single individual should have unquestioned power. A single-judge
approach is indicative of a way of working that many women do not
mediators. Women tend to see their roles as more transformative, and they ask more questions,
work more collaboratively, and described themselves less as neutrals than do male mediators. Helen
R. Weingarten & Elizabeth Douvan, Male and Female Visions of Mediation (Center for Research on
Social Organization, Working Paper No. 334, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 1986).
249. See, eg., MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JusricE (1982); DON
HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES (manuscript on file with the author).
250. The Judiciary Act (Evarts Act) of 1891, ch. 517, Section 6, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
251. Chief Justice Rehnquist and others have suggested providing discretionary rather than
mandatory appeals. Address by Justice William Rehnquist at the 75th Anniversary of the Univer-
sity of Florida College of Law (Sept. 15, 1984) (on file with the author). For criticism of this propo-
sal see Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal A Late-Century View, 38 S.C.L. Rav.
411 (1987); and Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603 (1985).
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embrace. As Adrienne Rich reminds us, women come with traditions of
sharing work;25 2 we understand that responsibility for tasks can be joint
and the work improved by collaboration. Thus, feminism can inform the
structures of adjudication, can object to an effort to concentrate power in
one judge, while still accepting some concentration of power in judges.
In short, I do not question the search - in the name of feminism as
well as other ideologies - for alternative processes and remedies, but I
do question sustained hostility to adjudication. Feminist theory under-
scores the need to look hard at current modes of adjudication. For the
first time in this country's history, feminists are beginning to be able to
participate in courtroom processes in more than a tokenistic fashion. I
want to explore a world in which we become self-conscious about the
necessity of empowerment of the previously powerless. I want to see if
we can create institutions in which the participants need not be infan-
tilized by the elevation of judges - and lawyers253 - to the status of
Other. I am reminded of Virginia Woolf. "Anything may happen when
womanhood has ceased to be a protected occupation, I thought, opening
the door." '254 I want to accept and redefine the experience of empower-
ment, rather than reject it as unfeminist.
CONCLUSION: A CELEBRATION OF THE
PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT
Feminism leads me to demand revision of the conception of the task
of judging. The heretofore male law of judges has made impossible
demands. Impartiality and disengagement can never be achieved, hence
all judgment is (sub rosa) suspect, hence we are always living in a second
best world in which we cover our tracks with doctrines of insulation.
Judges are in a permanent state of apology, for judges can never com-
pletely fulfill the aspirations of otherness. Listen to the voice of Learned
Hand:
You must have impartiality. What do I mean by impartiality? I mean
you mustn't introduce yourself, your own preconceived notions about
what is right. You must try, as far as you can, it is impossible to
252. Adrienne Rich, Foreword to WORKING IT Our at xviii-xxiv (Sara Ruddick and Pamela
Daniels eds. 1977).
253. This essay has focused upon judges as Others. Lawyers potentially play a similar role -
infantilizing and dominating clients. Reconsideration of adjudication, from a feminist vantage point,
requires attention to and reconstruction of the roles of both lawyers and judges. See generally Wil-
liam H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wsc. L.
REv. 29.
254. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OwN 41 (1957).
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human beings to do so absolutely, but just so far as you can, not to
interject your own personal interests, even your own preconceived
assumptions and beliefs.255
It appears that Judge Hand thought there were two possibilities, to cease
to be in order to hear another's claims, or to be, and then to be impermis-
sibly interested. Feminism rejects the choice between being a blank slate
and imposing oneself on another, between having no interest and being
corrupted by self-interest.
Carol Gilligan, Robin West, Sara Ruddick, Rosemary Ruether, and
many other feminist theorists offer another tradition. The ethic of car-
ing, the tension of connection and separation, the maternal state of power
and powerlessness, the theology of God/ess as creator and liberator all
suggest that we can inhabit a world that need not apologize for its
humanity. Dignity and honor can become intrinsic to the task of
responding to the conflicting claims of individuals, and the ordinariness
of much that is judging need not be obscured in an effort to privilege the
impersonal. With the help of feminist insights, we can increase the "folk-
tales of jurisdiction" and cherish tales of judicial relinquishment of
power. We must tell the stories of specially-appointed ad hoc courts and
of changing hierarchical arrangements.
Judgment is a problem. Judgment is a burden. Judgment does
engender pain. But judgment is also an act of obligation, of responsibil-
ity, of connection of self to others. Judgment may be empowering for
those judged as well as for those who hold the office of judge. If we can
learn to conceive of the judges as ourselves, we may learn how better to
render judgments.
255. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRT OF LIBERTY 309-10 (Irving Dillard ed. 1958), as quoted in a
letter by Judge Robert H. Hall, The Tenure of Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 320, 321 (1987). Pat Cain,
supra note 203, offers another interpretation of this text. 61 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1955.
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